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THE PROCESS DUE INDEFINITELY
DETAINED CITIZENS·
CARL TOBIAS ..

A very controversial feature of the "war on terror" is the scope of
the power which Congress has granted President George W. Bush
to designate suspected terrorists enemy combatants and indefinitely
detain them. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has most fully, if not clearly, resolved this question.
The United States incarcerated two citizens with little process for
more than a year in the Charleston and Norfolk naval brigs. The
first litigated three habeas corpus petitions before the Fourth Circuit
and a fourth to the Supreme Court before the government released
him. The second convinced a South Carolina district judge to grant
his habeas petition, although the Fourth Circuit overturned that
decision and the government effectively mooted the Supreme Court
appeal by indicting him. The war on terror's indefinite character
indicates that additional detainees will be imprisoned, and will
pursue relief, in Fourth Circuit districts and the Fourth Circuit will
decide appeals of the determinations.
These ideas suggest that the Fourth Circuit war on terror
jurisprudence merits review. The Article first descriptively analyzes
the government's use of executive authority to detain numerous
Americans and non-citizens, then critically assesses Fourth Circuit
resolution of habeas challenges to detention. Finding that the
the Article proffers
court's jurisprudence is unclear,
recommendations that clarify the precedent with a meticulously
calibrated balance of national security and civil liberty.
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** Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank Sashi
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INTRODUCTION

One highly controversial aspect of the "war on terror" is the
scope of the statutory authority that Congress has delegated
President George W. Bush to designate and indefinitely detain as
enemy combatants persons whom the Government suspects are
terrorists. In none of the twelve regional circuits has this issue been
so thoroughly ventilated, albeit unclearly resolved, as in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The government imprisoned two American citizens with minimal
process for over a year in the Norfolk and Charleston naval brigs.
Yaser Esam Hamdi litigated three Fourth Circuit appeals and one
Supreme Court appeal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before
his ultimate release. 1 Jose Padilla persuaded a South Carolina district
judge to issue a habeas writ, but the Fourth Circuit reversed that
determination, and the United States essentially mooted the Supreme
Court appeal by choosing to indict him after three years' detention. 2
The war on terror's indefinite nature suggests that more detainees
will be held, and will seek relief, in Fourth Circuit districts, and this
appellate court will resolve appeals of the decisions.
These propositions mean that the Fourth Circuit war on terror
jurisprudence requires scrutiny, which this Article undertakes.
Section I descriptively reviews how the Government has invoked
executive power to detain many Americans and non-citizens. Section
II critically analyzes Fourth Circuit disposition of habeas petitions
attacking incarceration. Because the Fourth Circuit's jurisprudence
lacks clarity, Section III offers suggestions that elucidate the
precedent through a finely calibrated balance of national security and
civil liberty.
I. DESCRIPTIVE ASSESSMENT

Non-citizen and citizen indefinite detentions jeopardize the rule
of law and expose the flaws in the "realist critique"-the notion that
compliance with international law would undermine American and
global security-thereby requiring discontinuation of the strictures

l. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded,
542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2002);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir. 2002); infra note 210 and accompanying
text (documenting his release).
2. See Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 692 (D.S.C. 2005), rev'd, 423 F.3d 386,
397 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062 (2006).

1690

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

which ordinarily govern. 3 For instance, executive branch officials
proffer many arguments to suspend the rules that normally apply in
criminal prosecutions. The ideas encompass the cost, time, and risk
which federal court trials are said to impose, the purported lack of
necessity for safeguarding terrorists' liberties, the assertions that
available information fails to meet strict evidentiary requirements and
national security demands its secrecy be maintained, and the view
that indefinite detentions provide the Government much needed
control. 4
The United States has imprisoned 15,000 terrorism suspects for
long periods. Since 2001, executive officers have followed thenAttorney General John Ashcroft's directive to use "every available
law enforcement tool" for incapacitating those "who participate in, or
lend support to, terrorist activities" with: (1) protracted detentions
through criminal charges and material witness warrants for people in
America legally, and (2) immigration charges for suspects in the
nation unlawfully, which some observers have described as profiling
mostly targeted at U.S. Arab and Muslim communities. 5
The Bush Administration rationalizes this effort with the
practical contentions enumerated above and with legal arguments
based mainly on Article II of the Constitution; Ex parte Quirin, the
World War II Supreme Court decision that involved Nazi saboteurs;
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) that Congress
passed immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks; as

3. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS:
DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE wAR ON TERRORISM 5 {2003) (observing that since
September 11, society has not struck a proper balance between national security and
individual liberties); Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism:
Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1407, 1410-11 (2002).
4. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 977 {2002) (observing
that military tribunals permit the use of classified evidence to convict suspects); Dickinson,
supra note 3, at 1437; see also Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism and Military
Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 328, 330-32 (2002) {highlighting the problems with
federal courts and international trials and suggesting that military commissions may offer
the best alternative). See generally James Mann, For Bush, Realpolitik is No Longer a
Dirty Word, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, § 4, at 5 (describing the dynamics of the Bush
presidency regarding foreign policy).
5. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS
12, 17 (April 2003) [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. For comprehensive assessments of
detentions, see COLE, supra note 3; Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good
Citizens: Legitimizing The War on Terror(ism), 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 88-91 (2004).
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well as material witness and immigration legislation. 6 The detentions
are shrouded in secrecy, which restricts external monitoring and
which courts have thus far generally maintained. 7 However, the
initiatives to detain non-citizens and corresponding legal attacks on
those efforts, especially regarding the persons whom America has
incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay, raise issues that differ from citizen
detentions and litigation and, therefore, are not this Article's focus. 8
The United States has also detained American citizens by
labeling them enemy combatants. In 2002, President Bush so
certified Yaser Hamdi, whom the Northern Alliance had purportedly
captured on an Afghan battlefield and whom the United States
6. See U.S. CONST. art. II; 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Authorization for Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. I
2001)); 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2006). See generally MICHAEL
DOBBS, SABOTEURS: THE NAZI RAID ON AMERICA (2004) (outlining the Nazi sabotage
plan that led to the Quirin case); LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A
MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LA w (2003) (providing a complete overview of the
Quirin trial); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005) (interpreting the AUMF as it applies to
three specific issues in the war on terrorism); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power
in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673 (2005) (offering a critical reply to the
Bradley & Goldsmith piece).
7. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'I Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (holding that information regarding persons detained after 9/11 need not be
disclosed), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104, 1104 (2004); N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft,
308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that newspaper publishers do not have a right to
access deportation proceedings that present national security concerns), cert. denied, 538
U.S. 1056, 1056 (2003). But see Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710, 2002
FED App. 0291P (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that there is a First Amendment right of access
to deportation proceedings).
8. Neither is the detention of Ali Saleh Kahleh Al-Marri, the habeas petitioner in
Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164-66 (4th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane granted, (Aug. 22,
2007) (No. 06-7427), because he is a non-citizen. I mention Al-Marri, however, in
footnotes when applicable because it is an important Fourth Circuit war on terror case.
The U.S. has detained 600 non-citizens at Guantanamo Bay. OIG REPORT, supra note 5;
MICHAEL RATNER & ELLEN RAY, GUANTANAMO: WHAT THE WORLD SHOULD KNOW
10 (2004). Observers have reported horrible conditions, the use of abusive measures to
extract confessions and more information, and that many have attempted suicide. Jeffrey
Toobin, Inside the Wire, NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 2004, at 36, 38; COLE, supra note 3, at 3943; Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1313-14; see, e.g., Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134, 1136
(D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004). Few detainees had much process until
2004 when the Supreme Court decided the appeals of some, so all detainees have received
some process, and the United States will schedule at most seventy-five for military
commission trials. See generally Carol D. Leonnig & John Mintz, Judge Says Detainees'
Trials Are Unlawful, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2004, at Al (describing the outcomes of and
reactions to the Hamdi district court decision); Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Interviews 14
Qaeda Terrorism Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2006, at A18 (describing the procedures
that have been put in place for those who are charged with war crimes); Carol Rosenberg,
Base Plan Unchanged, Bush Aides Say, MIAMI HERALD, May 9, 2006, at A3 (stating that
at most seventy-five will have commission trials).
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imprisoned without access to counsel until February 2004. 9 A habeas
corpus petition was filed on his behalf with the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which issued rulings
favorable to Hamdi, but the Justice Department sought review of the
trial judge's determinations in the Fourth Circuit. The court of
appeals issued three opinions essentially reversing the district court
treatment, and the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the
Government could detain Hamdi as an enemy combatant, although
he must receive due process to challenge this designation. 10
In May 2002, the Government served a material witness warrant
in Chicago's O'Hare Airport on Jose Padilla, alleging that he was
implicated in a plot to detonate a "dirty bomb," and four weeks later
the Chief Executive designated Padilla an enemy combatant. 11 His
attorney filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, which the judge denied;
however, the Second Circuit ruled that Congress had not empowered
the President to detain Padilla. The Supreme Court vacated that
opinion because he sued in the wrong jurisdiction. 12 When Padilla
refiled in the United States District Court for the District of South
9. See Jerry Mark on, Terror Suspect, Attorneys Meet for I st Time, WASH. POST, Feb.
4, 2004, at B3. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and
Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 503, 525-28 (2003)
(addressing judicial review of two Hamdi challenges in the Fourth Circuit); Ingrid Brunk
Wuerth, The President's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants": Modern Lessons from
Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1567 (2004) (discussing how cases from
the War of 1812 can help illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of deferring to
Presidential war powers); COLE, supra note 3 (generally outlining military detentions and
enemy combatant status); Dickinson, supra note 3 (same).
10. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 542
U.S. 407 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294
F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002).
11. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699-700 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd,
542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004); see Donna R. Newman, The Jose Padilla Story, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 39, 40 (2003). Larry Thompson, then-Deputy Attorney General, argued Quirin was
"clear Supreme Court" authority to detain Padilla "under the laws of war as an enemy
combatant." Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, Press Conference Concerning
Jose Padilla at the U.S. Department of Justice (June 10, 2002); see also Leti Volpp, The
Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2002) (describing a postSeptember 11 trend in which Muslims and Arabs are "identified as terrorists, and are
disidentified as citizens").
The U.S. relied on these authorities to hold him
"incommunicado for nearly two years." See Lyle Denniston, Enemy Combatant Gets
Lawyer, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 2004, at A3.
12. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd,
352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004); see Deborah Sontag,
Terror Suspect's Path From Streets to Brig, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at Al; Deborah
Sontag, U.S. Judge Finds Padilla Competent to Face Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at
A14.

2007]

INDEFINITELY DETAINED CITIZENS

1693

Carolina, the trial judge granted the habeas petition in February
2005. 13 A Fourth Circuit panel reversed this determination that
September, and the Government effectively mooted Padilla's
Supreme Court appeal by prosecuting him two months later. 14
This Article's next segment considers how district and appellate
judges have treated the two petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed
by American citizens contesting their designation and detention as
enemy combatants and emphasizes the Fourth Circuit's resolution.
II. THE DETENTION CHALLENGES AND THEIR RESOLUTION
A.

The Hamdi Litigation
1. District Court

Judge Robert Doumar, who initially entertained the habeas
corpus petition filed on Yaser Hamdi's behalf with the Eastern
District of Virginia, rigorously scrutinized the Government's
arguments for indefinitely detaining Hamdi and found that executive
constitutional authority, separation of powers, and Ex parte Quirin
mandated no judicial deference to the citizen's enemy combatant
designation. 15 Judge Doumar "appointed counsel and ordered access
... before allowing the United States even to respond," suggested
that the American Government was possibly hiding disadvantageous
information, and required the United States to produce considerable
material. 16 He strenuously questioned "everything in the Mobbs
declaration," the affidavit prepared by a Government official which
certified Hamdi was an enemy combatant; said that he "intended to

13. See Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 692 (D.S.C. 2005). The same judge
rejected Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri's habeas petition mainly because he was a non-citizen.
See Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 677-78 (D.S.C. 2005). A Fourth Circuit panel
initially reversed the decision; however, the court will rehear the appeal en bane. See AlMarri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 195 (4th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane granted, Al-Marri v.
Wright, (Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 06-7427).
14. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062 (2006) (denying certiorari); see also
Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 583 (4th Cir. 2005) (denying order to transfer Padilla from
military custody); Neil A. Lewis, Court Refuses U.S. Bid to Shift Terror Suspects, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at Al (describing the case and reaction).
15. Judge Doumar's approach warrants somewhat limited review because the
Supreme Court rejected it. See infra notes 62--64 and accompanying text.
16. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460--62 (4th Cir. 2003); see also id. at 476
(showing that the panel rejected Judge Doumar's actions in Hamdi).
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'pick it apart' piece by piece;" and concluded that the information
tendered fell "far short of supporting Hamdi's detention." 17
2. Fourth Circuit
The United States Government pursued three appeals from the
rulings by the district court, and the Fourth Circuit overturned much
of Judge Doumar's treatment. For example, the appellate panel
cabined review and maintained that Quirin supported judicial
acquiescence to presidential views on indefinite detentions. 18
Moreover, the appeals court did not scrutinize Hamdi's
imprisonment; rather it trusted the Mobbs declaration's allegation
that Hamdi was in the combat zone, recited this particular fact as
"undisputed," and denied Hamdi access to counsel. 19 The court did
so, even though the declaration was executed by a bureaucrat who
lacked any first-hand knowledge about the seizure. The judges also
found that the Non-Detention Act presented no bar to incarceration
of an "armed and hostile citizen captured on the battlefield during
wartime," which the AUMF and 10 U.S.C. § 956(5) concomitantly
authorized. 20 The panel expressed grave concerns that the judiciary
not interfere with executive and legislative prerogatives to make war
or jeopardize the ongoing military initiative. 21
The Fourth Circuit denied the suggestion for rehearing en bane,
yet the opinions filed in this matter elucidated the panel judgment
and afforded helpful recommendations for deciding the case.
Illustrative were Judge Michael Luttig's proposals to articulate

17. Id. at 462. Judge Doumar evidenced greater rigor than the district judge in Padilla
I. See infra Part Il.B.l. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va.

2002) (affording other examples of Judge Doumar's rigor).
18. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942) (upholding the President's decision to detain suspected German
saboteurs and try them by military commission). The panel did reject the most extreme
U.S. position that "courts may not second-guess" a military enemy combatant designation.
Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283.
19. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 472-77. Hamdi received limited access in February 2004.
Markon, supra note 9.
20. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 467. The judges held that the Non-Detention Act, 18
U.S.C. § 4001(a), did not modify the rule on enemy combatant detentions and that
Hamdi's detention was authorized by the AUMF's "necessary and appropriate force"
words and 10 U.S.C. § 956(S)'s appropriation to detain "persons 'similar to prisoners of
war.'" See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 467-68.
21. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 462-63, 471-77. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 6.10-6.12 (7th ed. 2004) (outlining the
President's role in times of war); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LA w § 4-6 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief).
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clearer legal standards for reviewing detentions. 22 Judge Diana
Gribbon Motz correspondingly authored an eloquent disquisition on
how the judicial responsibility to protect liberty compels a more
searching factual inquiry for which she offered astute practical
guidance. 23
3. Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist as well as Justices Anthony Kennedy and Stephen Breyer,
wrote the plurality opinion which found that Congress had authorized
the President to detain U.S. citizens when he labeled them enemy
combatants, but that these individuals were entitled to procedural due
process. 24 Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment that Yaser Hamdi should
receive due process but dissented from certain features of the process
which Justice O'Connor afforded as well as from the holding that
lawmakers had granted the Chief Executive this detention power. 25
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented,
asserting that the Government could only detain citizens if the United
States prosecuted them or lawmakers had suspended the writ of
habeas corpus under Article 1.26 Justice Clarence Thomas also
dissented, effectively acquiescing to the theory urged by the
Department of Justice that the President had nearly complete
authority over individuals designated as enemy combatants. 27
The plurality first determined that the executive branch had
power to imprison citizens by labeling them enemy combatants.28
Justice O'Connor seemingly acknowledged that the Non-Detention
22. He also urged that the Fourth Circuit undertake clearer factfinding. See Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 357 (4th Cir. 2003).
23. See id. at 368-76. This may have presaged her opinion for the panel majority in
Al-Marri. See Jerry Markon, Vacancies Whittle Away Right's Hold on Key Court, WASH.
POST, Aug. 8, 2007, at Al. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, the Hamdi panel decision
author, defended the decision by criticizing both judges' views. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
337 F.3d at 341-45. Wilkinson stated: "[t]o compare [Hamdi's) battlefield capture to the
domestic arrest in Padilla v. Rumsfeld is to compare apples and oranges." Id. at 344.
24. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 507-39 (2004). I broadly quote the plurality
to capture best its intent.
25. See id. at 539-54; see also infra notes 68--69, 85, 87 and accompanying text (further
discussing the plurality opinion in Hamdi).
26. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-79; U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2.
27. See Hamdi, at 579-99; U.S. CONST. art. II.
28. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-24; see also supra notes 9-14 (discussing the initial
lower court challenges to both Hamdi's and Padilla's enemy combatant status); infra notes
148, 156, 170-79 and accompanying text (addressing Padilla's status as an enemy
combatant).
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Act, which Congress had passed in 1971, might require express,
specific authorization from lawmakers to detain citizens on American
soil. 29 The jurist concluded, however, that the September 2001
AUMF supplied this predicate because that authorization necessarily
contemplated the detention of individuals who purportedly were
captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan. 30 Justice O'Connor
recognized that the AUMF "does not use specific language of
detention" but nevertheless held that this Act constituted
authorization "[b]ecause detention to prevent a combatant's return to
the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war" and,
therefore, by "permitting the use of 'necessary and appropriate force,'
Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the
narrow circumstances considered here." 31
The plurality
determination also characterized Ex parte Quirin as "the most
apposite precedent that we have on the question of whether citizens
may be detained in such circumstances," remarking that the World
War II opinion "both postdates and clarifies Milligan,'' which was a
Civil War-era decision. 32
Justice O'Connor admonished, however, that "[e]ven in cases in
which the detention of enemy combatants is legally authorized, there
remains the question of what process is constitutionally due to a
citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status. " 33 She ascertained
that the situation's resolution necessitated a "careful examination
both of the writ of habeas corpus ... and of the Due Process Clause,
which informs the procedural contours of that mechanism in this
instance. " 34
29. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-18; see Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
30. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-21; Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L.
No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. I 2001));
infra note 94 and accompanying text.
31. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519; see also Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2, 115
Stat. at 224; supra note 6 and accompanying text (introducing the AUMF). But cf AlMarri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 177--89 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that the AUMF did not
authorize Al-Marri's detention), reh'g en bane granted, (Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 06-7427); see
also AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224; supra note 6 and accompanying text
(introducing the AUMF).
32. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 523; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). But see
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 569-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality's reliance on
Quirin). But cf Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 178--89 (affording a different analysis of Quirin and
Milligan). See generally TRIBE, supra note 21, § 4-6 (discussing the significance of
Milligan).
33. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 524.
34. Id. at 525; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (addressing the suspension of
habeas corpus); id. amend. V (Due Process Clause); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243, 2246 (2000)
(outlining the process for seeking a writ of habeas corpus).
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The plurality observed that the litigants held radically different
views of the process which should be due in this circumstance, yet
began on "common ground" 35 : "[a]ll agree that, absent suspension,
the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual
detained within the United States," and Congress has suspended the
writ "[o]nly in the rarest of circumstances .... " 36 Justice O'Connor
stated that "[a]t all other times, [the writ] has remained a critical
check on the Executive, ensuring that it does not detain individuals
except in accordance with law," and the parties agreed the writ had
not been suspended. 37 The habeas corpus legislation "makes clear
both that Congress envisioned that habeas petitioners would have
some opportunity to present and rebut facts and that courts in cases
like this retain some ability to vary the ways in which they do so as
mandated by due process." 38
The Government argued that the flexibility which the habeas
corpus technique offered and Hamdi's situation meant that the
Mobbs declaration-the affidavit submitted by a Department of
Defense official certifying Hamdi was an enemy combatant-would
afford sufficient process for two major reasons. 39 Justice O'Connor
"easily rejected" the first contention by the United States that
Hamdi's detention in a combat zone was "undisputed." 40 The
circumstances of his seizure were neither factually conceded "nor
susceptible to concession in law," while the " 'facts' that constitute the
alleged concession [were] insufficient to support Hamdi's
detention." 41 The jurist warned that an assertion that an individual
"resided in a country" where combat operations are proceeding
represented no concession that the person was " 'captured in a zone
of active combat' operations in a foreign theater of war" and it
"certainly is not a concession that" the detainee met the
Government's enemy combatant standards. 42 In short, the plurality
35. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525; see ALFRED C. AMAN JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 180 (2001 ).
36. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (addressing
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus).
37. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("[t]he
writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive
detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest").
38. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243, 2246 (outlining the
process for habeas corpus).
39. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526; see also supra note 19 (introducing the Mobbs
declaration).
40. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526.
41. Id.; see also supra notes 22-23 (treating two opinions the plurality invoked).
42. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 527.
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opm1on repudiated "any argument that Hamdi ha[d] made
concessions that eliminate any right to further process." 43
Justice O'Connor found more difficult the Government's second
argument that greater factual exploration was improper and
unwarranted in light of the exceptional "constitutional interests at
stake."44 Under this contention's extreme version, "[r]espect for
separation of powers and the limited institutional capabilities of
courts in matters of military decision making in connection with an
ongoing conflict" would totally eliminate individual process and
relegate courts to ascertaining whether the general detention system
was authorized. 45 The United States claimed that, at most, judges
should review enemy combatant designations with the highly
deferential "some evidence" criterion, which focuses exclusively on
the Government's factual premise to support its determination and
asks whether any evidence sustains the conclusion.46 If applied to the
enemy combatant situation, the criterion would mean that a
reviewing court assumes the Government-enunciated basis is accurate
and scrutinizes only whether the premise was valid. 47 Hamdi
responded by asserting Supreme Court precedent required that
someone whom the Executive detains have an opportunity to
challenge the detention's legal and factual underpinnings before a
neutral tribunal. 48
Justice O'Connor said that both positions emphasized legitimate
concerns and highlighted the frequent tension between the autonomy
the Government claims it needs to pursue efficaciously a specific
objective and the process a citizen asserts is due before the individual
will be deprived of essential constitutional rights. 49 She observed that
the "ordinary mechanism," which the Supreme Court employs in
balancing these "serious competing interests" and ascertaining the
procedures required to guarantee that a citizen is not "deprived of

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 527-28.
48. See id. at 528. Judge Doumar essentially concurred with this because he
apparently found the process should approximate that which would attend a criminal trial.
See also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussing the district court decision in
Hamdi).
49. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528. See generally AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 35, at
172-73 (describing the due process procedures that may be imposed in certain
circumstances); id at 18~2 (describing the modern method for determining the process
due a person articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
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life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," is the test
articulated in the 1976 decision of Mathews v. Eldridge.so
Mathews requires a judge to determine the process which is due
in a specific case "by weighing 'the private interest' " that official
behavior will affect against the claimed governmental interest,
" 'including' the function involved and the burdens the Government
would face in providing greater process."s 1 The Mathews formula
then envisions those concerns' judicious balancing through an
assessment of the risk that the private interest will suffer improper
deprivation, were process decreased, and the "probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards."s2
Justice O'Connor scrutinized the balancing test's particular
elements in turn. Justice O'Connor first declared that there were
"substantial interests" on each side of the case. She characterized
Hamdi's as the "most elemental of liberty interests-the interest in
being free from physical detention by one's own government"-at
due process's core, and an interest whose fundamental nature the
Court had always safeguarded and would not minimize in the Hamdi
appeal.s 3 The Justice proclaimed that neither wartime circumstances
nor accusation of treasonous conduct offsets this strong value because
"commitment for any purpose" would be a significant liberty
deprivation which mandates due process protections.s4 Justice
O'Connor emphasized due process's "absolute" character in that it is
not dependent on the validity of a claimant's allegations and found
the Mathews calculus unchanged by the assertions regarding a
detainee's misconduct or the organizations with which he purportedly
associated.ss In short, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed a citizen's
essential right of freedom from involuntary confinement by the

50. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 (quoting Amendment V
of the U.S. Constitution); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 336. See generally William Van Alstyne,
Cracks in the "New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977) (discussing the due process revolution).
51. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. See generally Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) (analyzing how much process is due, pre-Mathews).
52. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (citation omitted). See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976)
(providing an overview of the due process factors set out in Mathews); AMAN & MAYTON,
supra note 35, at 172-75, 178, 180-82 (outlining due process and Mathews).
53. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)
(stating that freedom from bodily restraint is the core liberty protected by the due process
clause).
54. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)).
55. Id.
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United States without due process and balanced liberty's curtailment
against the opposing governmental interests. 56
The plurality then assessed the "weighty and sensitive" interests
of the Government in preventing individuals who have fought for the
enemy from resuming combat against the United States. 57 Justice
O'Connor said that the Constitution entrusts those who are best
situated to undertake, and most politically accountable for, strategic
decisions with basic war-making tactical matters. 58 The jurist also
emphasized that the plurality's due process analysis considered the
potential of litigation to distract military officials fighting overseas, to
reveal delicate intelligence material, and to "require a futile search
for evidence buried under the rubble of war," insofar as the
application of heightened measures would foster these possibilities. 59
Justice O'Connor declared that striking the appropriate
constitutional balance was of great national importance during
ongoing combat, but found the values which the United States holds
dear and the privilege of citizenship equally significant. 60 The jurist
observed that the "[n]ation's commitment to due process is most
severely tested" in emergencies, yet during these very moments
America must preserve its domestic commitments to those tenets for
which the United States battles abroad. 61 After the Justice recognized
the competing factors, she determined that neither the process
recommended by the Government, nor that which the district court
judge who first treated Hamdi apparently contemplated, struck the
correct balance. 62 Applying the Mathews test, Justice O'Connor
found the risk that a detainee might be erroneously deprived of
liberty under the rule suggested by the United States unacceptably
high, 63 while certain "additional or substitute procedural safeguards"
entertained in the district court were not warranted, given their

56. Id. at 531; see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("[m]ere
public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's
physical liberty").
57. Harndi, 542 U.S. at 531.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 531-32.
60. Id. at 532; see also infra note 88 and accompanying text (observing that national
security issues should remain a consideration).
61. Harndi, 542 U.S. at 532 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 16465 (1963)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 532-33 (citation omitted).
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"limited 'probable value' and the burdens they may impose on the
military." 64
The plurality, therefore, held that a detained citizen who seeks to
contest his enemy combatant designation must receive notification of
the classification's factual premise and a "fair opportunity to rebut
the
Government's
factual
assertions
before
a
neutral
decisionmaker." 65 Justice O'Connor specified that the "right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard 'must be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,' " declaring that
"[t]hese essential constitutional promises may not be eroded."66
The jurist simultaneously admonished that "the exigencies of the
circumstances" may require that, apart from these rudimentary
components, enemy combatant designation proceedings be tailored to
relieve "their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time
of ongoing military conflict." 67 For example, Justice O'Connor stated
that the decisionmaker might need to accept hearsay as the most
dependable Government evidence and to apply a "presumption in
favor of" this proof, so long as the presumption is rebuttable and
there is a fair opportunity to refute it. 68 Thus, after the United States
tenders credible evidence that the detainee satisfies the enemy
combatant standards, the "onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut
that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the
criteria." 69
Justice O'Connor justified affording this basic procedural due
process with illustrations of how it would minimally affect the central
war-making functions. For example, Justice O'Connor said initial
battlefield captives would only receive the process which the plurality
detailed after the Government continues to hold persons it has
seized. 70
The jurist contended that documentation respecting
battlefield detainees "already is kept in the ordinary course of
military affairs," so requiring an affidavit to summarize pertinent
64. Id.; see also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (outlining the district
court's decision).
65. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. See generally Friendly, supra note 51 (analyzing how
much process is due, pre-Mathews); Van Alstyne, supra note 50 (discussing the due
process revolution).
66. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (citations omitted); see also AMAN & MAYTON, supra note
35, at 182 (addressing the timing of a hearing).
67. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
68. Id. at 534; see also infra text accompanying note 87 (reiterating Justice O'Connor's
ideas in the text).
69. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
70. Id.; see also supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing why Justice
O'Connor believes more process may be needed).
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material would impose little burden. 71 She also believed that
restricting the hearings to the purported combatant's actions would
not disrupt efforts by military officers to wage war or meddle in the
armed forces strategy. 72
Justice O'Connor summarized by remarking that the thorough
protections which accompany detention challenges in other situations
might be improper and unworkable for enemy combatants. 73
However, she asserted that the "threats to military operations" were
not so substantial "as to trump a citizen's core rights to challenge
meaningfully the Government's case and to be heard by an impartial
adjudicator. " 74
Justice O'Connor concluded with justifications for the plurality's
holding and further explication of the result. First, she observed that
the plurality necessarily rejected the assertion by the United States
that separated powers mandated a sharply circumscribed role for the
judiciary in this situation. 75 O'Connor warned that the argument
which the Justice Department proffered would serve "only to
condense power into a single branch" and "would turn our system of
checks and balances on its head. "76 She concomitantly proclaimed
that the Supreme Court had "long since made clear that a state of war
is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of
the Nation's citizens" and that the "Constitution ... most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
stake."77 Justice O'Connor similarly acknowledged the critical nature
of the war power even as she declared that the authority "does not
remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties." 78
The plurality also stated that, absent legislative suspension, the writ of
habeas corpus "allows the [j]udicial (b]ranch to play a necessary role
in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an
important judicial check on the Executive's discretion in the realm of
detentions. "79
71. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
72. Id. at 535.
73. Id.; see also supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (concerning allowing the
detainee to rebut the evidence).
74. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.
75. Id. at 535-36.
76. Id. at 53~37.
77. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)).
78. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, amend. V (addressing the respective powers of
the legislative and executive branches and due process).
79. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (citation omitted); see also supra notes 3~37 and
accompanying text (explaining that habeas corpus is an important check on the
Executive).
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Justice O'Connor deemed the Government-proffered "some
evidence" standard insufficient because due process mandates a
system in which a detained citizen may refute his designation. 80 She
explained that the Supreme Court had previously deployed the "some
evidence" idea as a "standard of review, not as a standard of proof." 81
Judges have principally used the concept in scrutinizing an
"administrative record developed after an adversarial proceedingone with process" similar to that required in Hamdi. 82 The criterion,
therefore, was ill-suited to circumstances "in which a habeas
petitioner has received no prior proceedings before any tribunal and
had no prior opportunity to rebut the Executive's factual assertions
before a neutral decisionmaker." 83 The Justice correspondingly
declared, "Hamdi has received no process," and summarily rejected
the notion that his military interrogation "constitutes a
constitutionally
adequate
factfinding
before
a
neutral
decisionmaker. " 84
Justice O'Connor next tendered additional guidance. She
remarked that an "appropriately authorized and properly constituted
military tribunal" could satisfy the demands which the plurality had
articulated and that existing military regulations may offer the
requisite process in similar circumstances. 85 Without this process, a
district judge who entertains a habeas petition from an alleged enemy
combatant must guarantee that due process's minimum requirements
have been afforded. 86 The jurist reiterated that a habeas court might
accept affidavit evidence, if the judge enables the purported
combatant to tender facts rebutting the governmental return. 87
Justice O'Connor implored district courts to proceed with caution
and undertake a "factfinding process that is both prudent and
incremental," while the jurist similarly trusted that judges confronting
80. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537; see also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text
(describing the Government's argument as to how the evidence should be reviewed).
81. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537.
82. Id. (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)).
83. Id.; see also supra notes 65--66 and accompanying text (describing Justice
O'Connor's discussion regarding the importance of allowing an opportunity to rebut the
government's evidence).
84. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537; see also supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (stating
that the Court found that Hamdi made no concessions).
85. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538; see also Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,
Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, Army Regulation 190-8, ch. 1, § 6 (1997)
(dictating that under the Geneva Convention, tribunals should be made available for
detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status).
86. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538.
87. Id.
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these delicate matters would "pay proper heed" to national security
and the "constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties that
remain vibrant even in times of security concerns." 88 The plurality,
thus, vacated the Fourth Circuit judgment and remanded the case for
further proceedings. 89

B.

The Padilla I Litigation
1. District Court

The trial court's disposition of Padilla deserves evaluation
because it relied upon Hamdi's Fourth Circuit treatment and decided
questions that the Supreme Court ultimately resolved. 9° For instance,
District Judge Michael Mukasey extensively applied Quirin, which
distinguished "lawful and unlawful combatants [who] are likewise
subject to capture and detention," 91 finding incarceration power by
analogy, 92 and which he said based military tribunal approval on
Article II presidential authority. 93 He also deferred when ruling that
a tepid "some evidence" proof burden would justify citizen detention;
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), the Non-Detention Act, governed only civilian
imprisonment; and the AUMF empowered Bush to detain Padilla. 94
88. Id. at 539.
89. Id. For more analysis of Hamdi, see generally Bradley and Goldsmith, supra note
6 (discussing the Hamdi plurality opinion and its attention to the AUMF); Trevor W.
Morrison, Hamdi's Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
411 (2006) (highlighting the differences between the O'Connor and Scalia opinions in
Hamdi); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663
(2005) (examining executive power from a purely administrative Jaw perspective); infra
note 210 and accompanying text (documenting Hamdi's release).
90. See generally Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
For example, the district court in Padilla determined whether the President had authority
to detain a U.S. citizen and what evidence standard should be applied in determining
whether the prisoner was lawfully detained and exhibited judicial deference. See infra
notes 91-96 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text
(outlining the Fourth Circuit's acquiescence to executive power in Hamdi). Trial court
disposition also contrasted with the Hamdi district court resolution and the Padilla Second
Circuit approach.
91. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-95 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 3G-31
(1942)).
92. If the Supreme Court perceived detention as Jess onerous than a military tribunal
trial and "approved even that greater consequence, then our case is a fortiori from
Quirin." Id. at 595.
93. Congress had expressly approved military tribunals in World War II, so Quirin
specifically reserved the question of whether the Executive alone might have power to
create them. Id. at 595-96 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28-29).
94. Id. at 590, 596--99, 605-10. Judge Mukasey seemed to base deference on limited
authority and competence to decide the issue and great executive power but did hold
Padilla should have access to counsel. Id. at 599-605; see Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C.
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The judge also invoked Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer for
the notion that the Executive was "operating at maximum authority"
when holding Padilla as an unlawful combatant." 95 He located this
effort in the first category of Justice Robert Jackson's renowned
template which addresses interbranch disputes, making the initiative
least vulnerable to attack and judicial scrutiny, as the President has
full executive power and all Congress delegates. 96
2. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit's use of the model articulated by Jackson,
however, yielded different results. It held that: (1) "the President
lacks inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to
detain American citizens on American soil outside a" combat zone;
(2) the Non-Detention Act is an "explicit congressional 'denial of
authority,' " placing the endeavor in Jackson's last tier; and (3) the
"AUMF does not authorize the President to detain [citizens] on
American soil," leaving this action in the third category, so the
Executive is acting in contravention of congressional action and its
actions are most susceptible to attack and judicial scrutiny. 97
Numerous propositions support the holdings which the appeals
court espoused. The panel first assessed relevant constitutional text
and observed that the Commander-in-Chief powers warranted
deference. 98 The panel stated, however, that the federal judiciary
must scrutinize and resolve challenges to executive authority, if it
proceeds, even when making "war, in the face of apparent
congressional disapproval [and these separated] powers concerns are

§ 4001(a) (2000); Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541(Supp.I2001)).
95. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)). See generally Youngstown at Fifty, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 1
(2002) (affording many articles evaluating Youngstown at fifty from numerous
perspectives); MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS
OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977) (affording a valuable, comprehensive historical account
of the Youngstown case).
96. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson used a second, or
twilight, zone and a third tier in which executive power is least and receives the most
scrutiny. See Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 373, 410-16 (2002) (affording Jackson's analytical framework).
97. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542
U.S. 426 (2004).
98. Id. at 712-13; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 6.2 (noting that
Hamilton believed it was "dangerous to restrict executive powers too severely"); TRIBE,
supra note 21, § 4-6 (outlining the President's executive war powers).
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heightened" by domestic initiatives. 99 Finding no specific authority, 100
the appellate court explored whether inherent executive power
satisfied the document's "carefully crafted restraints" to guarantee
that only the branch which had authority used the power. 101 Because
the Constitution authorizes lawmakers, not the President, to "define
and punish ... offenses against the Law of Nations;" 102 identify the
breadth accorded, and suspend, the habeas corpus writ; 103 and make
exceptions from the Third Amendment ban on peacetime quartering
of soldiers, 104 the discrete grants are "a powerful indication that,
absent express [legislative approval,] the President's Commander-inThe
Chief powers do not support Padilla's confinement." 105
"specificity with which the framers allocated" this domestic authority
to Senators and Representatives, and the lack of "any even nearequivalent grant ... in Article H's catalogue of executive powers"
also prevented the judges from "read[ing] any such power into the
Commander-in-Chief clause." 106 The panel intimated that lawmakers
might possess detention authority, but the court stated that the
"President, acting alone, does not." 107
The majority then canvassed relevant Supreme Court precedent.
It believed Quirin inapplicable, as the Justices in that case left
unresolved whether the Executive alone could establish military
tribunals and found legislative approval for commission trial of
"combatants who violated the laws of war" to support military
jurisdiction. 108 The panel further distinguished Quirin because

99. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 713. Jackson said "Congress, not the Executive, should
control [the use of war powers] as an instrument of domestic policy" and deferred little to
Executive use of military power. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644.
100. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 713; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LA w § 4.1 (2d ed. 2002) (outlining Justice Jackson's concurrence).
101. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 714-15; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)
(affording the quotation in this text); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-88 (affording the other
concepts in the remainder of the clause in the text).
102. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 10; see Padilla, 352 F.3d at 714.
103. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2; see Padilla, 352 F.3d at 714 (analyzing the suspension
clause).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. III; see also Padilla, 352 F.3d at 714-15 (stating that the Third
Amendment reflects the "Framers' deep-seated beliefs [about preventing] military
intrusion into civilian life").
105. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 715 (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 631-32). For a similar analysis of Youngstown,
see Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 190-94 (4th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane granted, (Aug.
22, 2007) (No. 06-7427).
108. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 716 (citation omitted). "Quirin does not speak to whether, or
to what degree, the President may impose military authority upon U.S. citizens
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lawmakers had enacted a statute 109 and the Nazi saboteurs admitted
they were enemy troops. The Supreme Court, thus, never reached
Padilla's dispositive issue-the limits of "executive military
jurisdiction-as the 'Quirin petitioners upon the conceded facts, were
plainly within those boundaries.' " 110 The appeals court found
inapposite a pair of Fourth Circuit Hamdi opinions because they were
predicated on the detainee's seizure in an active combat zone
overseas. 111 Finally, the panel distinguished the Supreme Court's
Prize Cases 112 as implicating "capture of enemy property-not
[citizen] detention" 113 and a presidential endeavor Congress had
authorized 114 one-hundred years before legislators had passed the
Non-Detention Act. 115
Having determined that constitutional text and relevant Supreme
Court opinions did not allow the Executive to detain American
citizens, the panel surveyed whether lawmakers had approved the
incarceration. The majority consulted the Non-Detention Act's
terminology: "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained
by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." 116 The
judges read these words as a proscription on all citizen detentions, a
"conclusion first reached by the Supreme Court." 117 Further, the
panel deemed the legislative history "fully consistent with" its view
because the enactment's sponsor and the major opponent "repeatedly
confirmed" that the law governed presidential attempts to detain in
domestically without clear congressional authorization. We are reluctant to read into
Quirin a principle [the Court] specifically declined to promulgate." Id.
109. Because Congress did not pass the Non-Detention Act until 1971, the panel
remarked that the "Quirin Court did not have to contend with Section 4001(a), [so that
Quirin's] usefulness is now sharply attenuated." Id.
110. Id. (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 46 (1942)). The panel said Quirin and Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), concluded that "primary authority for imposing
military jurisdiction upon American citizens lies with Congress [and] that-at a
minimum-an Act of Congress is required to expand military jurisdiction." Padilla, 352
F.3d at 717.
111. Hamdi had no occasion "to address the designation as an enemy combatant of an
American citizen captured on American soil." Padilla, 352 F.3d at 717; see Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003).
112. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
113. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 717-18. The dissent invoked The Prize Cases for broad
inherent constitutional power. Id. at 726.
114. Id. at 718; see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668-70 (discussing
Congressional authorization to suppress insurrection).
115. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 718; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000) (providing the
Non-Detention Act).
116. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 718 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)).
117. See id. See generally Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 479 n.3 (1981) (interpreting
§ 4001(a)).
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wartime and evinced Congress' intent that it "must specifically
authori?'.e detentions." 118 The appellate court said that the legislation
precluded civilian and military detentions, 119 finding: (1) this idea left
executive war powers "unabridged" because the "President, acting
alone" lacks inherent authority to detain; 120 and (2) a statute's
"placement" should not "trump text, especially" when clear and
"fully supported by legislative history." 121 The panel concluded that a
"precise, specific" law "is required to override" the enactment's ban
on all citizen detentions 122 and, thus, searched for this approval. 123
The appeals court detected none in the AUMF's phrasing 124 and
construed the words vis-a-vis the tenets which the Supreme Court
articulated in Ex parte Endo: judges must interpret wartime
measures "to allow for the greatest possible accommodation
between" war exigencies and civil liberties and find that "lawmakers
intended to place no greater restraint on the citizen than was clearly
and unmistakably indicated by the language they used." 125 Nothing in
the plain terms granted the Executive power to detain American
citizens on U.S. "soil, much less the express authorization required by
section 4001(a) and the 'clear,' 'unmistakable' language" which Endo
demanded. 126 Because the AUMF was "meant to constitute specific
statutory authorization within" the War Powers Resolution, 127 the

118. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 718-19. These indicia and its passage by 257 to 49 were
"strong evidence [the Act] means what it says [: no) citizen can be detained without a
congressional act authorizing the detention." Id. at 720.
119. See id. at 720. The United States asserted that the Non-Detention Act only
precluded civilian detentions. Id. at 720-21.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 721. The United States said placing§ 4001(a) in a section on prisons did not
limit executive war power, and next to § 4001(b)'s exclusion of military prisons, showed
Congress intended to exclude military detentions. Id.
122. Id. at 720; see also supra notes 24, 30-31 and accompanying text (describing the
Hamdi plurality's interpretation of the AUMF).
123. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 722. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 13.4
(assessing Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473 (1981)).
124. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 722; see also id. at 725-26 (reproducing the AUMF).
125. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944) (holding that "whatever power the War
Relocation Authority may have had to detain classes of citizens, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 9066, it had no authority to subject citizens who were concededly loyal to its
leave procedure"); see Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723. For a discussion on the importance of the
Endo decision, see generally Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1933 (2003).
126. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723; see WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 38 (1994).
127. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723; see The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000);
see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 6.12 (discussing the war powers
resolution); Robert J. Glennon, Jr., The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later, 78 AM. J.
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panel thought it "inconceivable" that Congress would mandate such a
resolution to employ force overseas yet "leave unstated and to
inference something so significant and unprecedented as
authorization to detain American citizens under the Non-Detention
Act." 128 Moreover, 10 U.S.C. § 956(5), which "authorizes nothing
beyond the expenditure of money," failed to satisfy the NonDetention Act, the requirements that Endo had propounded as well
as Fourth and Fifth Amendment guarantees. 129
3. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit disposition on
procedural grounds.13° Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of the
majority opinion in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas joined, held that the petitioner's immediate custodian, the
commander of the South Carolina naval brig where the United States
detained Padilla, was the only proper respondent. 131 The Chief
Justice grounded the holding on the express terminology in the
habeas corpus legislation, which states that the appropriate
respondent is "the person who has custody" over the petitioner, and
on relevant Supreme Court determinations which have articulated an
"immediate custodian" rule. 132 Therefore, the majority observed
INT'L. L. 571, 581 (1984) (concluding that The War Powers Resolution did not give
Congress the intended increase in its war-making power).
128. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723; see also Bryant & Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, supra
note 96, at 386-98 (suggesting that neither the AUMF nor the Patriot Act grants the
Executive Branch the authority to detain American citizens).
129. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723-24. Judge Richard Wesley, who concurred in part and
dissented in part, differed with respect to many aspects of the majority opinion. For
example, he found the "President, as Commander-in-Chief, has inherent authority" for,
and the "Joint Resolution specifically and directly authorized," detentions. Id. at 726.
130. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004). The opinion, therefore,
warrants less comprehensive assessment than the determination in Hamdi. However,
Padilla deserves some evaluation, as this case might have been the litigation in which a
federal court actually provided the due process mandated by Hamdi. See infra notes 15456.
131. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 440-43; see also 10 U.S.C. § 951(c) (2000) ("There shall be
an officer in command of each major military correctional facility. Under regulations to
be prescribed by the Secretary concerned, the officer in command shall have custody and
control of offenders confined within the facility which he commands, and shall usefully
employ those offenders as he considers best for their health and reformation, with a view
to their restoration to duty, enlistment for future service, or return to civilian life as useful
citizens.").
132. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434-35; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242-43 (2000) ("The writ, or
order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person
detained."); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885) ("[T]he writ must be directed to
the person in whose custody the party is."); Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir.
1986) ("[T]he custodian is the person having a day-to-day control over the prisoner.");
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longstanding federal court practice accorded with the statute and case
law and reaffirmed that the proper respondent is the warden of the
facility in which the individual is detained, not the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Defense, or another remote supervisory officer. 133
Chief Justice Rehnquist ascertained that neither recognized
exceptions to this doctrinal concept nor those which Padilla and the
four dissenting Supreme Court members urged were applicable. 134
For instance, the majority summarily rejected the habeas petitioner's
arguments that the rule is flexible and should not govern the facts
related to his unusual circumstances. 135 The Chief Justice specifically
found that nothing undermined the rationale or statutory foundation
for the doctrinal approach when physical custody is at issue in "core"
habeas proceedings, such as the one which implicated Padilla, even
though the majority acknowledged the notion of custody had
expanded over time. 136 The majority similarly recognized the unique
nature of Padilla's incarceration; however, it concluded that the
appellee was basically disputing physical custody which the Executive
had imposed. 137 These findings prompted Chief Justice Rehnquist to
hold that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, the court in which Padilla had originally filed, lacked
jurisdiction. 138 The majority observed that lawmakers had inserted
phraseology in the habeas corpus enactment to prevent a judge from
issuing the habeas writ on behalf of an applicant who was located a
substantial distance from the court. It also found this commonsense
reading justified by other provisions of the habeas legislation, related
statutory exceptions to the "district of confinement" notion, and
Jones v. Biddle, 131 F.2d 853, 854 (8th Cir. 1942) ("The statutes relating to habeas corpus
manifestly contemplate that the respondent named in an application for habeas corpus
shall be the person, within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, who has the physical
custody of the person of the petitioner and who is capable of producing him in court.").
133. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435-38; see also Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707, 712
(7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the warden of the facility is the proper custodian).
134. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435-38; see also id. at 454-55, 459--04 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
135. See id. at 435-38. But see Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973)
(rejecting "interpretations of the habeas corpus statute that would suffocate the writ in
stifling formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and scholastic
procedural requirements.").
136. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435-37; see also Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1972)
(holding that there is proper jurisdiction other than where the custodian is located if a
majority of the petitioner's contacts with the custodian occurred in the other jurisdiction).
137. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 439-40; see Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410
U.S. 484, 499-500 (1973) (explaining that the jurisdictional requirements of the writ can be
flexible in certain circumstances).
138. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442.
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Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(a).1 39 Finally, the Chief
Justice thought distinguishable important Supreme Court authority
which Padilla urged should be dispositive. 140 The majority, therefore,
overturned the Second Circuit judgment and remanded the appeal for
"dismissal without prejudice. " 141

C.

The Padilla II Litigation
1. District Court

Five days later, Padilla refiled a habeas petition in the district of
South Carolina, where the United States had incarcerated him. 142
U.S. District Judge Henry Floyd observed that three Supreme Court
opinions controlled his resolution: Hamdi, Ex parte Quirin, and Ex
parte Milligan. 143 He began the Hamdi analysis by stating that Hamdi
was allegedly taken into custody while on the battlefield in
Afghanistan, where he was carrying a weapon against U.S. forces, 144
but the Government arrested Padilla unarmed in the O'Hare Airport
and claimed he was plotting to attack the nation. 145 Judge Floyd said
that the Hamdi plurality deemed his incarceration appropriate under
the narrow factual circumstances presented-actively waging war
against U.S. forces on a battlefield overseas 146-and that the force
used to detain Hamdi came within the AUMF provisions. 147 In
contrast, the Government first used a material witness warrant to
hold Padilla on U.S. soil, and the later decision to designate and
139. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), 2242 (2000) (detailing who may issue a writ
of habeas corpus and how one is to be filed, respectively); FED. R. APP. P. 22(a) (detailing
habeas corpus proceedings). See generally Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 617
(1961) (discussing congressional intent behind limiting a court's jurisdictional ability to
issue the "great writ"); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212 (1952) (explaining the
authority of district courts to issue writs of habeas corpus under the 1867 act).
140. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 444-47. See generally Braden, 410 U.S. 484 (discussing the
history of the writ); Strait, 406 U.S. 341 (same).
141. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 451. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred
to explain their understanding of the statute's construction in light of the majority holding.
See id. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, considered wrong
the majority's description of Padilla's case as a "simple challenge to physical custody
[which] should be resolved by slavish application of a 'bright-line rule.'" Id. at 455. The
dissent ascertained that the specific rule was "riddled with exceptions fashioned to protect
the high office of the Great Writ" and contended that "this is an exceptional case that we
clearly have jurisdiction to decide." See id.
142. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (D.S.C. 2005).
143. Id. at 684.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 684-85.
146. Id.
147. ld.at685-86.
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imprison him as an enemy combatant was outside the AUMF
"necessary and appropriate force" strictures. 148
The court dismissed the Government's argument that Quirin
provided sufficient justification for Padilla's detention and must
control his situation. 149 Judge Floyd invoked the Padilla Second
Circuit opinion for the proposition that Quirin is limited to situations
in which Congress has explicitly permitted citizen detention outside
of the normal channels. 150
The jurist then relied on Milligan for the idea that "[t]he
President may not unilaterally establish military commissions in
wartime 'because he is controlled by law, and has his appropriate
sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the laws,' " 151
remarking that the military tribunal in this case "lacked any
jurisdiction to try Milligan when the civilian 'courts are open and
their process unobstructed.' " 152 The judge recognized that Quirin
limited Milligan; however, he asserted that Milligan's essential
premises control: "[t]he detention of a United States citizen by the
military is disallowed without explicit Congressional authorization." 153
The court next evaluated whether the AUMF had granted the
President sufficient congressional authority to detain citizens
militarily. 154 The jurist found that the Non-Detention Act prohibits
the United States from detaining a citizen "except pursuant to an Act
of Congress." 155 The Government argued that the AUMF authorized
the detention of citizens and "the Non-Detention Act does not apply
to the military's wartime detention of enemy combatants." The court
disagreed and relied upon the resolution's plain language, concluding
that it failed to authorize Padilla's detention, which directly
contradicted the Non-Detention Act. 156 Judge Floyd emphasized that
the AUMF did not reach a "citizen [who is] arrested in a civilian
setting, such as an United States airport,'' but it might permit the
detention of a citizen captured on the battlefield. 157 The judge found

148. Id. at 686.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 686-87.
151. Id. at 687-88 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866)).
152. Id. at 687 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121).
153. Id. at 688; see also Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 178-89 (4th Cir. 2007)
(affording similar analyses of Quirin and Milligan), reh'g en bane granted, (Aug. 22, 2007)
(No. 06-7427).
154. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 688.
155. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 689.

2007]

INDEFINITELY DETAINED CITIZENS

1713

that Ex parte Endo instructed that the purpose of Congress and the
Executive in passing a wartime statute "was to allow for the greatest
possible accommodation between those liberties and the exigencies of
war," 158 so a court must interpret legislation to encroach upon
citizens' civil liberty only insofar as the Act clearly and explicitly
provides. 159 Thus, because the AUMF did not include language that
"clearly and unmistakably" granted the Executive authority for
holding citizens such as Padilla, the AUMF failed to override the
Non-Detention Act.
Judge Floyd easily rejected the government argument that the
AUMF permitted citizen imprisonment, made in the preamble to the
presidential order which authorized Padilla's detention, observing
that "just because the President states Petitioner's detention is
'consistent with [American law does not necessarily make] it so.' " 160
Judge Floyd also summarily dismissed the United States' contention
that the Non-Detention Act's placement in the Crimes and Criminal
Procedure section of the United States Code indicated that the
legislation governed only civilian detentions, reiterating that the
statute was "clear, simple, direct, and unambiguous" and applied to
all citizen detentions.
The court next turned to the Government's argument that the
President's inherent power as Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief
authorized the detention of citizens such as Padilla. Employing
Justice Jackson's revered Youngstown concurrence, Judge Floyd
ascertained that because Congress had legislated on citizen detentions
through the Non-Detention Act, the President's authority was at its
"lowest ebb, for then [the Executive] can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional power of Congress
over the matter." 161 Finding that no law supported the Government's
contention that the Executive has the inherent authority to detain
Padilla, Judge Floyd ruled, as had Jackson, that "Congress, not the
Executive, should control utilization of the war power as an
158. Id. (quoting Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1945)); see also Al-Marri v. Wright,
487 F.3d 160, 188-89 (4th Cir. 2007) (affording a similar analysis of Endo), reh'g en bane
granted, (Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 06-7427).
159. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 689.
160. Id.; see also Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 178-89 (affording a similar analysis of the
AUMF).
161. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 690 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). The judge found U.S. support
for its position in The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668
(1862), and Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2000), factually inapplicable to
this case. Padilla, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 689.
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instrument of domestic policy." 162 Thus, the judge rejected the
Government's argument, as that position would "offend the rule of
law and violate this country's constitutional tradition, but it would
also be a betrayal of this Nation's commitment to the separation of
powers that safeguards our democratic values and individual
liberties. " 163
Finally, the jurist remarked that Padilla's detention was a
civilian, not a military, law enforcement matter. 164 Judge Floyd
suggested that civilian law furnished ample measures for the
Government to detain and prosecute Padilla, so his extraordinary
military detention was not only unlawful, but also unnecessary. 165
Therefore, as Congress had not suspended the writ of habeas corpus,
the jurist ordered Padilla released. 166
2. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit decision in the Padilla litigation warrants
careful evaluation, as it is the highest court to address the questions
raised. 167 However, the unanimous panel opinion deserves minimal
precedential value because the court subsequently issued an order
which undermined its earlier determination. 168 Indeed, the court
sharply criticized the Government's litigation posture and rejected its
suggestion that the determination be vacated.
Judge Luttig opened his analysis emphasizing the training which
Padilla allegedly received from al-Qaeda and its affiliates in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 169 He recounted that Padilla ostensibly
met senior al-Qaeda operations planner, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad,
who supplied training, financing, and travel documents and directed
that Padilla go to the United States and destroy apartment buildings.
When he returned from international training, the FBI arrested
Padilla in the O'Hare Airport before he could implement the alleged
plot.
162. Id. (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
163. Id. at 690-91.
164. Id. at 691.
165. See id. at691-92.
166. Id. at 692; see also Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 189-95 (4th Cir. 2007)
(affording similar analysis of inherent power and Youngstown), reh'g en bane granted,
(Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 06-7427).
167. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
168. Order, Padilla v. Hanft, No. 05-6392, CA-04-2221-26AJ (4th Cir. Dec. 21, 2005).
169. I rely in this paragraph on Padilla, 423 F.3d at 388-90. The judge seemed to draw
the following factual allegations recounted in the opinion from the U.S. factual statements
in the joint appendix. See id.
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Judge Luttig began his legal assessment with the idea that the
Hamdi plurality interpreted the AUMF as reaffirming the venerated
law of war principle that allows combatant detentions "to prevent a
combatant's return to the battlefield," which is a "fundamental
incident of waging war." 170 Reasoning that the AUMF, as construed
by the Hamdi plurality, enabled individuals, such as Hamdi, to be
designated and imprisoned as enemy combatants, the jurist asserted
that Padilla could be so labeled and confined as well. 171 The judge
stated that Padilla, like Hamdi, took up arms in Afghanistan against
Afghan forces aligned with the United States, and he associated with
forces in Afghanistan hostile to America. 172
Judge Luttig relied upon Quirin to bolster his conclusion that the
President had authority to designate Padilla an enemy combatant and
militarily detain him. 173 Like the Hamdi plurality, Judge Luttig could
not distinguish Haupt, the American citizen dispatched by Nazi
Germany to attack United States war production facilities and
detained in this country, from Padilla, who was also sent to commit
hostile acts on American soil before his O'Hare capture. Thus,
Padilla satisfied the enemy combatant definition under both Quirin
and Hamdi, so his detention was "unquestionably authorized by the
AUMF as a fundamental incident to the President's prosecution of
the war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan."
The jurist rejected Padilla's assertion that his detention was
unlawful. First, Padilla argued that the Hamdi plurality opinion was
confined to the petitioner's narrow factual situation-capture on the
battlefield in Afghanistan. 174 The judge dismissed this contention, as
the Hamdi plurality "never even mentioned the locus of the
petitioner's capture," 175 while finding his detention permissible
because the AUMF's authorization of necessary and appropriate
force implicitly sanctioned "detention to prevent a combatant's return
to the battlefield [as a] fundamental incident to waging war." 176 The
jurist dismissed the notion that the locus of capture supported the
plurality's reasoning, even as he admitted that the plurality
acknowledged that Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan when

170. Id. at 391 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality
opinion)).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 391-92.
173. I rely in this paragraph on id. at 392.
174. Id. at 393.
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
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responding to the Hamdi dissent. 177 Thus, Judge Luttig concluded
that, although the Hamdi plurality holding is narrow, it does not limit
presidential authority to detain individuals who take up arms against
the United States, "depending upon the geographic location where
that enemy combatant happens to be captured." 17s The judge
reinforced this position by observing that the Hamdi plurality read
Quirin to support Haupt's detention, even though he was captured
domestically .179
The Fourth Circuit also dismissed the argument that military
detention was unnecessary or inappropriate because Padilla was
amenable to criminal prosecution. 1so The court reasoned that
criminal prosecution may not achieve the same result as military
detention-preventing a combatant's return to the battlefield-and it
might allow communications between a suspected belligerent and his
confederates and impede Executive attempts to glean intelligence
from the detainee. 1s1 These factors make military detention, rather
than criminal prosecution, both necessary and appropriate uses of
force which the AUMF prescribes. 1s2
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Padilla's contention that the
AUMF is not a clear legislative statement authorizing detentions, as
both Ex parte Endo and Quirin require, interpreting neither decision
to mandate a clear statement rule. The panel depended on the
Hamdi plurality opinion for the idea that the AUMF provided a
sufficiently clear statement when Justice O'Connor said that "it [was]
of no moment that the AUMF does not use the specific language of
detention" 1s3 and the resolution " 'clearly and unmistakably'
authorized Hamdi's detention." 184 Thus, Judge Luttig concluded that
the authorization for Hamdi's detention applied equally to Padilla. 1s5
Finally, the jurist easily disposed of the argument that Ex parte
Milligan prevented both the Executive and Congress from trying
civilians in a military tribunal because the Hamdi plurality
determined that Quirin held Milligan inapplicable to enemy

177. Id.
178. Id. at 394.
179. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 394 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 518 (2004)).
180. Id. at 394.
181. Id. at 394-95.
182. Id. at 395.
183. Id. at 396 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519).
184. Id. at 394 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 519).
185. Id.
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combatants, 186 so Milligan did not govern Padilla, whom the President
had designated an enemy combatant. 187
After the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment,
Padilla filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. 188 Before the Justices
could address the petition, the Government indicted Padilla for
terrorist activities and sought to transfer him from South Carolina
military custody to Florida civilian custody. 189 The United States also
proposed that the Fourth Circuit opinion be withdrawn. 190 The panel,
in an unusual action, denied both Government requests, 191 intimating
that the litigation strategy was an effort to avoid Supreme Court
review 192 and questioning why facts which necessitated Padilla's
military detention were not sufficiently compelling to preclude his
transfer to civilian custody. 193 The Fourth Circuit's rejection of the
Government's motions based upon the inconsistent United States
actions severely erodes the determination's validity, although the
Supreme Court ultimately ordered that Padilla be transferred to
civilian custody. 194

D.

Summary By Way of Transition

This evaluation of Fourth Circuit precedent which resolved
habeas corpus petitions filed by citizens who disputed their enemy
combatant designations and indefinite detentions finds that the
appellate court's jurisprudence lacks sufficient clarity. Thus, the next
section of this Article affords suggestions for elucidating the law with
a carefully refined balance of the national security and civil liberty
interests which are at stake.

186. Id. at 396.
187. Id. at 396--97.
188. Order, Padilla v. Hanft, No. 05-6392, CA-04-2221-26AJ (4th Cir. Dec. 21, 2005).
189. Id. at 1-2.
190. Id. at 2.
191. Id. at 7.
192. Id. at 4.
193. Id. at 5-6.
194. Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084, 1084-85 (2006). In fairness, my criticism of the
Fourth Circuit for equating Padilla with Hamdi may be attributable more to the lack of
clarity in the Hamdi Supreme Court plurality opinion, which the Fourth Circuit was bound
to follow. See, e.g., supra notes 28-32, 67-69 and accompanying text.

1718

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

Ill. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

A.

An Introductory Word About Scope and Organization

The ideas below assume that the Hamdi Supreme Court plurality
opinion is a very important precedent, albeit splintered and with
caveats. A few reasons suggest that the Fourth Circuit's Padilla
decision warrants less weight and that more relevance should be
assigned to the district court's treatment of that case. For example,
the three-judge lower court panel that issued the Fourth Circuit ruling
too easily conflated the factual scenarios of Hamdi and Padilla and
overvalued the ramifications of that equation. Padilla's last-minute
indictment also discredited the Fourth Circuit opinion, a view
reinforced by Judge Luttig's withering critique of the United States'
litigation tactics, particularly its motion to vacate the determination.
The final section, thus, briefly criticizes the Fourth Circuit's Padilla
opinion and recommends that courts deemphasize it and rely instead
on the trial judge's habeas framework, if warranted by the facts which
Regardless of
specific lawsuits challenging detention present.
whether jurists subscribe to this guidance, this part then offers
suggestions for the minimum due process that judges should grant
citizens who attack the validity of their designations as enemy
combatants.
B.

A Critique of Padilla and Suggestions for Its Future Treatment

Several considerations undermine the Padilla Fourth Circuit
decision, especially as compared to the Hamdi Supreme Court
plurality opinion and the Padilla trial court resolution. First, Padilla
is a determination by a three-judge appellate court panel, rather than
the en bane circuit, much less the Supreme Court. The Fourth Circuit
also elided in an overly facile way the difference between Hamdi's
battlefield capture and Padilla's domestic airport seizure. This meant
the Hamdi plurality ruling governed Padilla, so the court ascertained
that lawmakers had empowered the President to designate and
imprison him as an enemy combatant and that he should not have
received habeas. Moreover, the panel undervalued Judge Floyd's
enunciation and application of habeas and his finding that Padilla
deserved a writ. Third, his eleventh-hour prosecution after lengthy
incarceration, which essentially mooted the Supreme Court appeal,
discredited the Fourth Circuit opinion that had been issued two
months earlier. This perspective derives much credence from the
Government's suggestion, although rejected, that the jurists withdraw
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the decision and from Judge Luttig's scathing criticism of the tortuous
U.S. litigation strategy, which he intimated eviscerated the factual
predicate on which the appellate determination rested. Three
Justices concomitantly penned an illuminating explanatory statement
that accompanied the denial of Padilla's certiorari petition, which
admonished that federal courts act promptly to insure the habeas
corpus writ's "office[s] and purposes ... are not compromised," if the
United States were to modify his status again. 195
These developments, especially the opinion's repudiation by its
author and by the Government withdrawal motion, sapped the ruling
of any vitality it once enjoyed. Indeed, although this determination
technically remains the law of the circuit, the judgment is now so
discredited that jurists must ignore or sharply circumscribe its
application and treat as most relevant the Hamdi Supreme Court
plurality opinion and the Padilla district court ruling.
Insofar as judges follow the above proposals, courts should
attempt to harmonize the O'Connor and Floyd determinations
through meticulous case-by-case analyses of individual petitioners'
factual circumstances. For example, jurists must generally accord a
citizen who is captured on the battlefield the process articulated in
the Hamdi plurality decision and reviewed below. A citizen whom
the Government arrests on United States territory, designates an
enemy combatant, and imprisons should typically receive the habeas
corpus safeguards espoused and applied by Judge Floyd. His careful
explication and application of habeas furnish a salutary template from
which district judges may extrapolate to address the myriad,
particular factual scenarios that the ongoing conflict will undoubtedly
generate. 196 These views obtain because, for instance, this citizen is
entitled to attack his incarceration's propriety through habeas in
federal court, the Government must justify the imprisonment of a
195. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1064 (2006). The Hamdi Supreme Court plurality
may deserve greater responsibility than the Fourth Circuit for certain criticisms I make of
Padilla. See supra note 194.
196. These examples are meant to be illustrative and suggestive. For example, the
locus of capture might be indicative, but not dispositive, as Judge Luttig states in Padilla.
See supra notes 174--79 and accompanying text. Thus, as a general matter, the citizen
taken on the battlefield overseas should have due process while the citizen arrested on
U.S. soil must receive habeas in federal court. More specifically, the passage of time
between Hamdi's battlefield capture and Padilla's O'Hare arrest as well as Padilla's
prosecution indicate both could have received habeas in federal court. The United States'
need for information that alleged terrorists possess may also be relevant. A related, but
less workable, construct is Justice O'Connor's exigent/non-exigent approach. See infra
notes 216-17 and accompanying text. These ideas reinforce the need for a meticulously
calibrated evaluation of the facts that specific detention challenges present.
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citizen arrested on United States soil, the Executive arguably lacks
power to so designate and hold a citizen, and Justice O'Connor
specifically observed that Hamdi was a very narrow ruling limited to
the peculiar facts of battlefield capture. The unpredictable as well as
fact-specific and intensive character of situations that will arise, the
virtually unprecedented nature of the judicial inquiry which habeas
requires in this context, and the skeletal legislative and case law
provision for habeas's application to these new situations complicate
the elaboration of more definitive, refined suggestions.
Finally, even if the Padilla Fourth Circuit opinion enjoys greater
applicability than envisioned, this will not modify the
recommendations below for the process due citizens, as the appellate
court remanded to the trial court with instructions that it deploy the
analytical construct enunciated by the Hamdi plurality ruling. For
instance, Justice O'Connor admonished lower courts to guarantee
that American citizens have notice of the factual bases for detentions
and meaningful hearing opportunities to challenge their legitimacy.

C.

The Process Due Citizens

Numerous factors impair articulation of thorough, salient
guidance for judging citizens' designation as enemy combatants. One
is that due process and habeas corpus are quite general, amorphous,
and capacious. Defining them is complicated because the Executive
has rarely detained citizens without prosecution. Yet, the Hamdi
plurality opinion identified the process that is due in many situations
and furnished individuals who lack notice of reasons for detentions
and hearing opportunities greater safeguards than those who had this
process, were convicted, exhausted appeals, and later sought relief. 197
These views may illuminate why the Hamdi plurality outlined both
tenets, while it afforded more suggestions and examples than nuanced
dictates and offered certain guidance that was terse, partial, or
unclear.

197. The major executive detention case is Quirin. 317 U.S. 1 (1942); see also Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (characterizing the interpretation of a statute that would
allow for the indefinite detention of aliens by the executive as one that would raise serious
constitutional questions). For cases defining due process, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note
100, § 7.3.3; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, §§ 13.9-13.10. Justice O'Connor stated
that due process informs habeas's procedural contours as a judicial review mechanism.
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). But see id. at 553, 575 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the plurality exceeds its authority under the Due Process Clause
"to prescribe what procedural protections it thinks appropriate.").
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Other complications include determining the Justices' alignments
on issues which Hamdi litigated and the problems that judges will
face as they evaluate various dimensions of Supreme Court
treatment, namely, aspects which secured less than a majority.
Instructive are the plurality ruling's features that concurring and
dissenting Justices Souter and Ginsburg approved and those which
dissenting Justice Thomas supported, a circumstance epitomized by
his vote to uphold citizen incarceration. 198
The war on terror also differs significantly from conventional
military engagements. For instance, the notions of "hostilities" and
the "opposition" remain uncertain, and lawmakers have yet to
declare war formally. 199 Moreover, the war on terror will generate a
plethora of scenarios in which neutral decisionmakers assiduously
calibrate the habeas process and balance the frequently conflicting
values that implicate security and liberty.
Another dilemma is how to conceptualize the hearings which
ascertain whether the United States has properly detained citizens.
Their denomination as criminal or civil would facilitate the
identification of salutary rules. The proceedings might be described
as quasi-criminal or a civil-criminal hybrid.
Nonetheless, the
deleterious ramifications for citizens deemed enemy combatantsliberty's indefinite deprivation and perhaps life imprisonment-locate
the hearings closer to the criminal end of the spectrum. 200

198. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 578, 587-89 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justices Souter and Ginsburg did "not mean to
imply agreement that the Government could claim an evidentiary presumption casting the
burden of rebuttal on Hamdi, or that an opportunity to litigate before a military tribunal
might obviate or truncate enquiry by a court on habeas." Id. at 553-54 (internal citations
omitted). This issue is additionally complicated because Justice Samuel Alito has replaced
Justice O'Connor, the plurality opinion's author, and Chief Justice John Roberts has
replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist.
199. The conflict appears sui generis but may resemble the Korean "police action" and
analogous initiatives since. See sources cited supra notes 95-96; see also supra notes 18687 and accompanying text. See generally Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, The
Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249 (2002) (discussing
how often the United States has committed armed forces into combat without a formal
declaration of war).
200. See Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778-83 (1994);
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
21, § 13.9(a) (discussing the criminal procedure standards that must be applied before an
individual can be deprived of liberty). Insofar as the hearings are conceptualized as
criminal, detainees will secure greater procedural safeguards; namely, those in the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In contrast,
military tribunals, as presently constituted, would afford detainees fewer procedural
safeguards. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the Justices, who believed that detention was valid
and the Mathews analytical framework. was preferable for treating
citizens designated enemy combatants, may have resolved Hamdi
incorrectly as the opinions by Justices Souter and Scalia argued. 201
However, a majority thought detention legitimate, while a plurality
favored use of Mathews in this situation. Thus, I assume these ideas
reflect the modern doctrine when tendering my views.
Justice O'Connor left several particulars for Congress, perhaps
because she recognized that the Constitution delegates military
governance to legislators, including who are "enemy combatants,"
and shared authority for federal procedure, such as mechanisms
which regulate the nascent hearings. 202 The jurist might also have
appreciated the difficulties surveyed above. They encompass how to
posit cogent guidance in one fact-bound ruling and accommodate
security and liberty during the unprecedented military initiative.
Lawmakers should expeditiously prescribe devices that will
thoroughly govern future hearings through the consultation and
incorporation of readily available sources, when necessary, which
judges may deploy, if warranted, pending the adoption of
comprehensive legislation. Most germane are the habeas statute;203
the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA);204 the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 205 and the various rules that
201. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539-44 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 554-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting); se·e also supra Part Il.B.2 (reviewing Second
Circuit analysis of the authority issue); supra Part 11.A.3 (offering greater treatment of the
Mathews formula); infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text (suggesting why Mathews
balancing test may have been inappropriately applied in Hamdi).
202. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-75 (2000). See generally Stephen B.
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (analyzing
shared authority for federal procedure); Peter H. Schuck, Terrorism Cases Demand New
Hybrid Courts, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at B13 (arguing for a new due process model in
enemy combatant cases); Jack L. Goldsmith & Neil Katya!, The Terrorists' Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19 (same). Of course, the Supreme Court, not Congress,
ultimately decides what process is due.
203. See 28 u.s.c. §§ 2241-2261 (2000); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 15 (4th ed. 2003). See generally RANDY HERTZ & JAMES s. LEIBMAN,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2001) (providing a
comprehensive guide to federal habeas corpus procedure).
204. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2000). See
generally Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of
September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 451-53 (2002) (discussing CIPA's effect
on criminal procedure); Cameron Stracher, Eyes Tied Shut: Litigating for Access Under
CJPA in the Government's "War on Terror," 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.173 (2003) (detailing
CIPA's restrictions on public access to judicial proceedings).
205. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801--63 (2000); see also
United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 554 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding electronic
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effectuate this legislation; new enemy combatant detention and
military tribunal authorization statutes;206 and the 1996 alien terrorist
removal system which has yet to be invoked.207
In late 2005 and 2006, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment
Act (DTA) and Military Commissions Act (MCA). 208
This
legislation, however, fails to provide guidelines that operate
felicitously and reconcile security and liberty across multifarious
circumstances because the legislation does not prescribe
comprehensive strictures and because those measures afforded are
overly solicitous of security. Until lawmakers prescribe thorough
legislation, judges will devise techniques ad hoc. For example,
Padilla's attorney filed in the District of South Carolina the very week
the Justices ruled he must sue there, and the judge relied on habeas
corpus to find that the Government lacked authority to detain
Padilla. 209 The Supreme Court also vacated and remanded Hamdi's
petition, even though the United States quietly freed the detainee
after thirty-four months of incarceration. 210

surveillance of defendants under FISA); COLE, supra note 3, at 67-68 (describing how the
PATRIOT Act's amendments to FISA have eroded constitutional protections under the
Fourth Amendment); PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM AND SECURITY:
WINNING WITHOUT WAR 105--06, 148-51 (2003) (explaining the Government's
surveillance powers under FISA and speculating that its constitutionality would most
likely be upheld); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KA y KANE, LA w OF FEDERAL
COURTS 20 (6th ed. 2002) (using FISA as an illustration of when "Congress has made
special provision for the designation of existing judges as a 'court' to perform particular
functions").
206. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005);
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); see Carl
Tobias, Punishment and the War on Terrorism, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1116, 1131 n.78
(2004). The Restoring the Constitution Act of 2007 would amend certain features, such as
enemy combatant designations and jurisdiction stripping, included in the Military
Commissions Act. S. 576, llOth Cong. (2007).
207. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-37 (2000); see also Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1340
(S.D. Fla. 2000) (finding that the Alien Terrorist Removal Act was not applicable), affd,
257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 205, at 20; Schuck, supra
note 202; Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 202. The stakes will often be considerably more
substantial in citizen indefinite detentions than in non-citizen removals.
208. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005); Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
209. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 692 (D.S.C. 2005); Dan Christensen &
Vanessa Blum, Padilla Implicated in Florida Terror Case, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 20, 2004, at
18.
210. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-11, 539 (2004); see Joel Brinkley & Eric
Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-American It Had Captured in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2004, at A15; Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST, Oct.
12, 2004, at A2.
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Despite the factors analyzed, it is possible to offer constructive
guidance for the legislative branch and the federal judiciary. The
suggestions provided depend on the H amdi opinions, to the extent
that the resolution is binding and clear, although the Justices'
treatment is general, laconic, ambiguous, and fragmented. Moreover,
the recommendations elucidate, amplify, and supplement this
disposition, when needed, and justify the views proffered. The ideas
below will have equal relevance for other citizens who may be
detained, like Padilla, but his apprehension and imprisonment on
U.S. territory meant that he could well have deserved more rights and
procedural advantages in challenging his enemy combatant
designation and detention than the ones which are explored next. 211
D.

Guidance

1. General Recommendations
The Supreme Court held that "a citizen-detainee seeking to
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity
to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker." 212 Justice O'Connor grounded that holding on the
test enunciated by Mathews. 213 She observed that this formulation
requires the adjudicator to calculate the process due by weighing the
effects of official conduct on the individual against the Government's
situation, notably the harm which additional measures could foster,
while balancing the risk that the private interest will suffer erroneous

211. Hamdi's release meant that the ideas would have applied first to Padilla, had the
United States not prosecuted him. See sources cited supra notes 14, 189, 209-10. Indeed,
Judge Floyd's enunciation and application of habeas corpus may be preferable to the due
process approach. For a sense of the national security-civil liberties spectrum, see
generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006); DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE,
LESS FREE: THE FAILURE OF PREEMPTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2007); JACK
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2007); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMUELE, TERROR IN THE
BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007); F.A.0. SCHWARZ & AZIZ
HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR
(2007).
212. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. The major elaboration was that notice and hearing
opportunity be "appropriate to the nature of the case" and be "granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner." Id. (citation omitted).
213. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334--35 (1976).
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deprivation, were process confined, and the likely value, if any, which
greater or replacement mechanisms would yield. 214
Justice O'Connor neglected to articulate clearly the process that
detainees must have. 215 The decision did, however, mention two
discrete categories of cases by implication. The first was exigent,
referring to those cases with "uncommon potential to burden the
Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict," in which detained
citizens would receive what Justice O'Connor denominated "core"
notice and hearing before impartial decisionmakers. 216 The second
category, non-exigent cases, which the Court failed to define, would
necessarily comprise the remaining cases. For this group, detainees
would be accorded more process than the rudimentary notice and
hearing granted in exigent cases, although the specifics of that process
remain undefined. 217
I believe the Constitution, its judicial interpretation, as well as
federal legislation and rules grant citizens designated enemy
combatants most, if not all, of the procedures that defendants indicted
for serious offenses receive, because the citizens may be indefinitely
deprived of their liberty. The procedures encompass the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, which circumscribe how the
Government investigates behavior that is deemed a crime and how it
prosecutes alleged violators, as well as devices in the United States
Code and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence.218
More specifically, the protections include: rights against improper
searches and seizures, double jeopardy, and self-incrimination; the
right to fair notice of the charges and an opportunity for assembling a
defense; compulsory process for securing witnesses and relevant

214. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529; see also supra notes 51-52, 62-64 and accompanying
text. See generally AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 35, at 180-82 (explaining the Mathews
due process test). But see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215. The Mathews test's use did lead Justice O'Connor to find the Government's
proposed "some evidence" criterion imposed an unacceptably high risk that it would
erroneously deprive a citizen of his liberty and to reject certain additional or replacement
protections the Hamdi district court suggested, as they had limited probable value and
might unduly burden the military. See supra notes 63-64, 80-83 and accompanying text.
216. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; see also supra notes 65, 67 and accompanying text; infra
notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
217. In exigent cases, national security and the Government would usually receive
more solicitude than individual liberties and the detainee, while in non-exigent situations,
the propositions would be reversed. However, the notion may be so generalized that it
defies particularly effective use.
218. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII; FED. R. CRIM. P.; FED. R.
Evm. Virtually all of the applicable provisions of the United States Code are enumerated
in Title 18, which principally defines federal criminal offenses.
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evidence; the right to confront and cross examine witnesses; and the
right to a full, adversarial trial in open court. 219
Several justifications support the provision of these rights to
detainees. Most telling, the enemy combatant designation hearings
are functionally equivalent to criminal proceedings because they
might result in liberty's deprivation for life, a grave consequence
highlighted by Justice O'Connor. 22° Citizen detainees who may
experience this fate, thus, should have greater rights and procedural
benefits than many civil litigants and individuals accused of offenses
whose situations are not as dire.
Third, few rulings have required judges to balance the liberty
interests of prosecuted adults against governmental interests as the
Mathews Court did 221 and as the Hamdi plurality envisioned. 222 The
most analogous opinions have implicated deprivations of liberty
interests, which those seeking postconviction relief and juveniles
vindicated. 223 Citizens who are deemed enemy combatants and are
deprived of their liberty also differ markedly from public assistance
recipients who are judged ineligible and would forfeit this benefit or
similar entitlements, the area where the Mathews calculus
originated. 224 Indeed, fifteen years ago the Justices rejected the
formula as a broad-purpose yardstick. They emphatically declared

219. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21,
See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2004) (outlining the constitutional guarantees that
accompany criminal procedure). The last idea in the text is the norm under the Sixth
Amendment and in habeas cases. See generally United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1
(1993) (holding that a charge of DUI and its accompanying maximum imprisonment term
of six months is a petty offense and outside the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee). I
rather comprehensively evaluate the proof burden below.
220. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520; see supra text accompanying note 56. For a rather similar
analysis, see Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 195 (4th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane granted,
(Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 06-7427).
221. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also supra notes 50-52, 63-64
and accompanying text.
222. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-34; see also supra notes 50-64, 146 and accompanying
text.
223. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229-35 (1990) (upholding a State's
procedure for the involuntary administration of an inmate's medication); Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 274-81 (1984) (upholding the pretrial detention of juveniles when notice, a
hearing, and a statement of facts were given prior to the detention). But see United States
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 667-81 (1980) (relying on Mathews balancing test in holding that
referral of a motion to suppress to a magistrate does not violate due process). See
generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 13.9(a) (discussing the procedural due
process required in cases that implicate a loss of physical liberty).
224. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 574-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also sources cited supra
notes 50-52.
§ 13.9.

2007]

INDEFINITELY DETAINED CITIZENS

1727

that the Court had "invoked Mathews to resolve due process claims
on only two occasions," questioning whether it was "essential to the
results," and held that the Mathews balancing test is not appropriate
for determining the legitimacy of state rules which are facets of the
criminal process. 225
If the Mathews notion could be justifiably transplanted from the
somewhat inapposite public entitlement realm and applied to
detentions, the detainee's liberty, a value that Justice O'Connor
characterized as absolute,226 should outweigh the governmental needs.
Even when reliance on techniques for protecting the individual's
liberty might jeopardize security and, thus, arguably yield a different
Mathews balance, the factfinder should consult and institute a number
of efficacious measures-which lawmakers have prescribed and the
judiciary has used-to vitiate, restrict, or ameliorate security
threats. 227
Notwithstanding these factors-how the grievous impacts on
citizens who may be adjudged enemy combatants demands the total
panoply of criminal law strictures-Justice O'Connor failed to ratify,
and might have disagreed with, these views. For example, she left
untreated a critical safeguard implicit in due process: one should not
be convicted unless found guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt." 228 She
actually imposed no proof burden on the United States and even
observed that its tender may have a rebuttable presumption and
could shift the burden to detainees in various circumstances, 229

225. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443-44 (1992). Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977), prescribed what Mathews described as the correct due process
approach, which remains so today. See LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 219,
§§ 2.7(c), 24.6(d). Justice Scalia said that the Mathews test "has no place where the
Constitution and the common law already supply an answer." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 576
(Scalia, J., dissenting). It is unclear why the Hamdi plurality relied so substantially on
Mathews, rather than opinions, such as Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356--00 (1997),
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-83 (1992), and United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987), because they address the precise question presented: the process due to insure
that someone detained non-criminally is actually who the government alleges he is. See
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 13.9, at 649-53 (assessing some of the cases).
226. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530-31.
Justice O'Connor mainly couched the
governmental interest in national security terms, but other factors may be relevant. These
include the fiscal resources that large numbers of hearings consume, typified by the
Guantanamo detainees and other difficulties posed by federal court prosecutions of
purported terrorists, such as Zacarias Moussaoui. See infra note 278 and accompanying
text.
227. Those mechanisms are canvassed supra notes 203--07 and accompanying text.
228. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 13.9. Accord LAFAVE, ISRAEL &
KING, supra note 219, §§ 10.4(a), 26.4(h).
229. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
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although Justices Souter and Ginsburg trenchantly disavowed the
idea that the Government might enjoy a presumption casting some
rebuttal burden on Hamdi. 230
Justice O'Connor also disparaged the rigor manifested by the
trial court that addressed the Hamdi litigation. The jurist initially
surmised that Judge Doumar favored what she rejected: using
mechanisms similar to those required in a criminal trial and "quite
extensive discovery of various military affairs ... [because] [a]nything
less . . . would not be 'meaningful judicial review.' " 231 Justice
O'Connor's dependence on the Mathews template similarly prompted
her to find inappropriate numerous requirements gleaned from the
criminal law arena, which she believed that the district judge
envisioned. She considered unwarranted some " 'additional or
substitute procedural safeguards' ... [recommended, given] their
limited 'probable value' and the burdens they may impose on the
military. " 232
This resolution suggests citizens ought to have, if not the rights
which are granted to defendants charged with felonies, at least the
measures afforded to habeas petitioners who lack both notice
describing why the Executive detains them and hearings, a situation
Quirin typifies. I have recounted the former, while the latter
analyzed below include possible counsel, discovery, and use of
evidentiary norms as well as the suggestion that the United States
tender justifications for holding c1t1zens which they have
opportunities to dispute. 233 The severe consequences, if detainees are
found to be enemy combatants, and Mathews's valuation of the
process due underlie the procedures detainees should receive. 234
Factfinders who judge whether citizens were accurately detained
must examine, and use throughout the hearings, a number of basic
concepts.
For instance, they should honor reciprocity and
evenhandedness when selecting and deploying various techniques.
Illustrative is Justice O'Connor's pronouncement that hearsay might
230. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 553 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
accord id. at 554, 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
231. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528; see supra notes 15-17, 64, 197-200, 212 and accompanying
text.
232. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (citation omitted); see also supra notes 15-17, 64 and
accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 219 and accompanying text. The criminal regime may afford
defendants fewer benefits than the civil one grants plaintiffs. See, e.g., infra notes 251-56
and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 220 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 50--64, 220-27 and
accompanying text.
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warrant acceptance as the most reliable government evidence
available. 235 If this does materialize, there should be commensurate
allowance for detainees' hearsay offers.
Reciprocity and
evenhandedness are major tenets of criminal procedure and evidence
jurisprudence, while CIPA dictates reciprocity in specific contexts. 236
2. Specific Recommendations
a.

The Neutral Decisionmaker

Justice O'Connor neither defined "unbiased arbiter" nor
identified who would satisfy the command. She did offer the general
rule that "even purportedly fair adjudicators 'are disqualified by their
interest in the controversy,' " and broached the "possibility that the
standards ... articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized
and properly constituted military tribunal." 237 Yet, Justice O'Connor
neglected to detail the latter suggestion, including when the military
entity should be used, and whether citizens whom the body decides
were correctly detained may secure federal judicial relief. She did
make multiple allusions to habeas petitioners and courts, while
Justices Souter and Ginsburg vociferously disputed that "an
opportunity to litigate before a military tribunal might obviate or
truncate inquiry by a court on habeas." 238 Furthermore, relevant
decisions that involved World War II military proceedings, such as
Quirin and analogous cases, would demand that judges hear
challenges to tribunal determinations upholding enemy combatant
designations. 239
Even though lawmakers have now authorized
commissions and prescribed how they function-which is a departure
from the bodies unilaterally created by the November 2001 Executive
Order-the tribunals may lack impartiality, as the decisionmakers

235. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 142 (1964); FED. R. CRIM. P. 2;
FED. R. Evm. 106, 611; Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(f)
(2000). See generally LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 219, §§ 1.5(i), 1.5U), 2.4
(describing the need for evenhandedness and fundamental fairness in criminal procedure).
237. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538. Justice O'Connor left unclear what exactly would
constitute a "disqualifying interest," whether military tribunals should be used in nonexigent cases, and whether an administrative hearing could suffice.
238. Id. at 546, 554 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
239. Ex Parle Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. l, 9 (1946). See
generally A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 309
(2003) (arguing that Quirin supports a broader view of the jurisdiction exercised by
federal habeas corpus courts than asserted by the Government).
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will remain in the military chain of command. 240 A superior option is
the federal judiciary whose lifetime appointment, undiminished pay,
and venerable traditions, especially its reputation for independence,
better guarantee neutrality. 241
b.

Identification of Non-Exigent and Exigent Situations

The arbiter should first decide whether "the exigencies of the
circumstances" necessitate that these hearings "be tailored to
alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time
of ongoing military conflict." 242 The assignment's fulfillment is vital,
as it will suggest whether to use the rudimentary process which
Justice O'Connor considered appropriate for exigent instances or
techniques more solicitous of detainees. She voiced the greatest
concern about national security but offered little guidance on when a
military action is proceeding, indicia which are burdensome, or ways
this duty to identify the type of situation could be satisfied.243
One threshold query the factfinder should resolve is whether the
decision to designate an individual as an enemy combatant implicates
an ongoing military endeavor. If a military effort is clearly in
progress, the decisionmaker should consult numerous factors related
to security and discern whether the Executive will be overburdened.
These include: where and when the Government apprehends the
citizen and stages the hearing; the person's value as an intelligence
240. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. § 2001 comp., at 918-21, 66 Fed. Reg.
57, 833 (Nov. 16, 2001). See generally Bryant & Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, supra note
96 (using the Youngstown framework to conclude that the President's Executive Order of
November 13, 2001 cannot preclude those it covers from invoking the jurisdiction of the
federal courts); Tim Golden, After Terror, A Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, § 1, at 1; Josh White, Panel for Detainees' Cases Cut in Half, WASH.
POST, Oct. 22, 2004, at A12; supra text accompanying note 6; sources cited supra note 206.
The DT A and the MCA sharply limit judicial review of military tribunal determinations,
and the statutes purportedly strip federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction. But see
Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 178-81 (1994) (holding that the presence of military
judges in a chain of command does not deprive litigants of due process). Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), invalidated the unilaterally created tribunals. The MCA
purportedly validated military tribunals. However, the Supreme Court's June 29, 2007
grants of certiorari in two cases suggest that it will consider the new tribunals' validity. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S.
June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195); Al-Odah v. United States, cert. granted, (U.S. June 29, 2007)
(No. 06-1196).
241. See U.S. CONST. art. III. Military tribunals at most should be reserved for
extreme circumstances, such as battlefield captures, assuming arguendo that this elusive
notion could be defined in the existing context.
242. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
243. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-35; see also supra Part II.A.3.
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source; the likelihood that military activities will be disrupted; or that
valuable material, such as names of putative informants or troops'
locations or battlefield strategies, might be revealed. 244

1. Non-Exigent Situations
When the factfinder concludes that hearings will not burden the
Executive while a military initiative proceeds, the adjudicator should
generally review and dep~nd on a number of vaunted mechanisms.
These could include several different requirements: those the
judiciary uses in criminal prosecutions; the techniques Congress and
judges have instituted for habeas attacks on executive detentions and
that lawmakers have fashioned for related matters (particularly those
implicating security, namely, hearings under CIPA, PISA, and the
alien terrorist removal legislation). The justifications discussed
earlier warrant application of these mandates. 245

a. Legal Representation
Imprisoned citizens must then be notified of the opportunity for,
and have access to, lawyers if they so wish. Justice O'Connor did not
clarify whether indigent detainees enjoy a guarantee, but Justice
Souter praised her "affirmation of Hamdi's right to counsel" 246 while
federal legislation offers attorneys to impecunious, detained noncitizens who are threatened with removal. 247 Even the Quirin
defendants, individuals whom President Franklin Roosevelt believed
warranted swift execution, had able counsel.248 Lawmakers must
proffer attorneys for indigent detained citizens, as they will have few
resources to oppose imprisonment. Until the Senate and House

244. This list excludes factors, such as fiscal costs, treated supra note 226. A categorical
approach-making battlefield captures exigent-lacks flexibility. For instance, even had
Hamdi been seized there, a hearing in America three years later appears non-exigent. The
approach that I suggest could afford the Government the opportunity to claim that all
situations are exigent or involve state secrets, thus frontloading the due process inquiry.
Judges should be aware of this possibility for tactical advantage and guard against it.
Doubts should be resolved in the citizen's favor, as the impacts are so severe.
245. See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
246. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539 {determining that Hamdi clearly had a right of access to
counsel on remand); id. at 533 {Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 {1963). See
generally LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 219, §§ 6.4, 11.1 (outlining the
constitutional right to counsel).
247. See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(l) (2000); see also sources cited supra note 207.
248. The Nazi saboteurs had competent representation before the military commission
as well as before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 6, at 195-96, 207-52;
Bryant & Tobias, Quirin Revisited, supra note 239, at 319-23.
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comprehensively legislate, the question might turn on the
proceedings' denomination because the Court has not mandated
representation of habeas petitioners who were found guilty,
exhausted appeals, and then sued. 249 Moreover, the detainee should
have the opportunity for thorough, confidential deliberations with the
lawyer and the requisite time to prepare fully for the hearings
(although the United States monitored the cursory, initial sessions
between Hamdi and his attorney after it denied them for two
years).250
b. Notice
Designation

of Facts

that Support the

Enemy

Combatant

Once those preliminary issues are resolved, the Government
must afford the citizen notice of why it designated him an enemy
combatant. Justice O'Connor provided only that this be appropriate
to the setting and "be granted at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner;" however, that phrase's reiteration indicates the
detainee should have the maximum facts which underlie the
allegation that he was "part of or supporting forces hostile to the
United States or coalition partners" in Afghanistan and "engaged in
an armed conflict against the United States" there. 251 The quality of
the opportunity to dispute the label will reflect the material which the
Government tenders, and the impact for someone who is adjudged an
enemy combatant will be profound. The detained citizen, therefore,
should receive the most information with the greatest detail that will
not jeopardize security, while the arbiter ought to employ numerous
mechanisms which are treated below that help prevent revelation of
valuable intelligence, as warranted.
The floor must be the
249. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 3 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. SSl, SSS (1987); see also LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 219, § 11.1 (discussing
the right to counsel in post-conviction relief). See generally supra note 203 and
accompanying text.
2SO. See Markon, supra note 9; Stuart Taylor Jr., A Failure of Leadership?, LEGAL
TIMES, July S, 2004, at S4; see also sources cited supra note 204. If the selection of a
private attorney should raise concerns involving national security, court appointment of a
federal public defender, such as Hamdi's counsel, might furnish greater assurance.
2Sl. Hamdi, S42 U.S. at S26, 533 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Concrete
Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., S08 U.S. 602, 617
(1993) (describing the due process requirement for a neutral decisionmaker); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. S32, S42 (198S) (explaining the due process
requirement for "some kind of hearing"); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80--81 (1972)
(describing the importance of being provided notice and an opportunity to be heard);
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (19SO) (referring to the
due process requirement for notice and opportunity to be heard).

2007]

INDEFINITELY DETAINED CITIZENS

1733

certification's documentation, which the plurality asserted and the
United States recognized, the military can easily locate. 252
Yaser Hamdi's situation is illustrative. The only evidentiary
basis for classifying him was the Mobbs declaration, a nine-paragraph
affidavit compiled by a Government official who lacked first-hand
knowledge about the detainee. Reliance on this affidavit that did not
explain various ideas-namely, its sources and the conditions under
which the data were gathered, the criteria applied when designating
Hamdi, and whether the United States possessed exculpatory
material-would have given the citizen an insufficient rebuttal
opportunity.

c. Detainee Access to Information
The factfinder must grant, basically through discovery, access to
the maximum relevant information that is consistent with the
protection of national security. Justice O'Connor analyzed the
central issues only tangentially, yet her demand that the citizen enjoy
a fair rebuttal opportunity requires that he have all the pertinent
material which justifies the designation. 253 For Hamdi, this might
have included his statements while in custody; the individuals and
documents Michael Mobbs consulted when drafting his affidavit; and
the papers that the Government would tender at the hearings.
Lawmakers have also prescribed access. For example, the
habeas and alien terrorist regimes, as well as CIPA and FISA,
generally manage information flow in similar contexts. The habeas
legislation authorizes petitioners to take evidence orally or by
deposition, interrogatory, or affidavit. It also implements rules which
govern some habeas matters, empowering judges to use the federal
rules-insofar as they do not violate the habeas provisions-and
allows discovery under the federal strictures for good cause. 254 When
other habeas rules are silent regarding access to information, the
judiciary can proceed in any legal way that honors the rules and
applicable U.S. Code sections, or it can decide motions under the
252. See supra note 51, 71, 214 and accompanying text. Civil process grants little notice
and criminal affords even less. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8; FED. R. CRIM. P. 3, 7, 9-11.
253. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; see also supra notes 65-66, 83, 202, 251 and
accompanying text.
254. 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2254, R. 6 Governing § 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts (2004); see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 203, § 19.4
(describing discovery and Rule 6 in greater detail). See generally B.racy v. Gramley, 520
U.S. 899 (1997) (addressing discovery requests in habeas proceedings); Harris v. Nelson,
394 U.S. 286 (1969) (same); Harris v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 1996) (same), cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1227 (1996).
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Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure. 255 The alien terrorist
removal law also enables district judges to issue subpoenas for
witnesses' appearance and to compel the production of documents or
similar objects which are clearly needed to resolve material issues. 256
d. Burden of Proof
The arbiter should next determine who has the burden of proof
and what the relevant standard is. Justice O'Connor left these
questions unaddressed for instances which are not exigent, yet she
found that the Government's tender, if credible, might have a
rebuttable presumption, and shift the burden to the detainee, in
exigent cases. 257 This material should be given little weight for nonexigent cases, however, as the usual doctrine requires that litigants
asserting a fact prove it beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
proceedings and by a preponderance of the evidence in civil
matters. 258
The jurist did intimate that the Government must show the
citizen was "part of or supporting forces hostile to [the nation] or
coalition partners" in Afghanistan and "engaged in an armed conflict
Justice O'Connor, thus,
against the United States" there. 259
apparently required that the Government establish two important
facts: (1) the detainee was a member of, or supported, hostile forces
in Afghanistan; and (2) battled there with the United States. This
quotation reflects the "enemy combatant" notion developed by the
Government for the ongoing military initiative; however, tenets
255. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, R. 6 Governing§ 2554 Cases in the United States District Courts
(2004); see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 203, §§ 41.1-41.8 (describing § 2255
habeas procedures for federal prisoners). Criminal process allows less discovery than civil,
but Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957), grants "defendants" more. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 16; LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 219, §§ 14.2(b)-15.3(a).
256. See 8 U.S.C. § 1534 (d)(l) (2000). If the enemy combatant hearings are criminal,
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), would require the U.S. to provide the "defendant"
favorable information. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v.
Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 3-4 (2002). For a recent
opinion that analyzes numerous issues regarding detainee access to information, see
generally Bismullah v. Gates, Nos. 06-1197, 06-1397, 2007 WL 2067938 (D.C. Cir. July 20,
2007).
257. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534, 538 (2004); see also supra note 67--08 and accompanying
text.
258. See infra notes 262--04 and accompanying text.
259. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brief for
the Respondents at 3, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6698)); see also COLE, supra note 3
(characterizing the treatment of Hamdi and Padilla as "pav[ing] the way for what will be
done to American citizens tomorrow"); Engle, supra note 5 (discussing conceptions of
non-citizens within the United States as hostile to U.S. interests).
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relating to authority and separation of powers might have led
Congress to modify Justice O'Connor's articulation of what must be
proved. 260 The jurist also repudiated as "inadequate" the "some
evidence" theory which the administration championed when it
opposed the Hamdi and Padilla litigation because the idea embodied
a "standard of review, not ... of proof," while due process commands
that detainees have a way to challenge their designations. 261
The factfinder must impose on the Government the burden to
show-preferably by clear and convincing evidence, arguably beyond
a reasonable doubt, or at least by a preponderance of the evidencethat it has met the criteria for designating a citizen an enemy
combatant. The Justices never require evidence which is less than
clear and convincing to authorize the substantial deprivation of a
citizen's liberty, so prescribing this burden would reaffirm the ideal
that "liberty is the norm and detention without a trial is the carefully
limited exception." 262 The Court also mandates proof beyond a
reasonable doubt when one is said to act illegally. 263
A
preponderance of the evidence burden governs most civil lawsuits
and alien terrorist removal. 264

e. Evidence
Although the Hamdi plurality neglected to mention the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the decisionmaker must scrutinize and apply to
the greatest practicable extent the contemporary understandings
imposed by those federal rules, 265 which the judiciary deploys in civil

260. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra notes 202, 258 and
accompanying text.
261. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537; see also supra notes 18-19, 46-47, 80--83, 94 and
accompanying text.
262. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755
(1987)); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (explaining the importance
of establishing a standard of proof in the detention context); Jones v. United States, 463
U.S. 354, 361 (1983) (discussing due process requirements in the context of mental health
commitments). See generally Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding
that the President lacked inherent constitutional authority to detain the alien petitioner as
an enemy combatant), reh'g en bane granted, (Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 06-7427).
263. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 703--04 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970); see also H.R. 1290
§ 4(a)(15), 108th Cong. (2003) (prescribing the standard). See NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 21, § 13.9.
264. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 337, PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES (5th ed.
1999); 8 u.s.c. § 1534(g) (2000).
265. FED. R. EVID.; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 264 (surveying how the burden
of proof is apportioned). See generally WI GMO RE ON EVIDENCE (1983).
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and criminal litigation. 266 For instance, the arbiter would exercise
broad discretion to judge witness credibility and the admissibility,
relevance, reliability, and weight of evidence.267 Thus, the factfinder
should infrequently admit hearsay offered by the Government when
situations are non-exigent. 268 Adherence to the rules is warranted
because they incorporate concepts which judges have long honored
and applied to foster equitable disposition.
Justice O'Connor did remark that a habeas court in the new
proceedings "may accept affidavit evidence" similar to the material
which designated Hamdi, so long as detainees might contest the
designations; however, she appeared to be referencing exigent
instances and suggested that the government must prove the
continuing military action leaves non-hearsay unavailable. 269
Therefore, if the scenario is non-exigent, reliance on affidavits would
generally be improper. Should the hearsay nevertheless be admitted,
the United States must at least produce those reports and records on
which it is based-documentation that Justice O'Connor maintained,
and the Government said, is now "kept in the ordinary course of
military affairs." 270 The harsh ramifications for a detainee who is
found correctly designated mean that the testimony of an official with
immediate, and purportedly extensive, knowledge about the label will
be valuable, insofar as allowing this submission is feasible. These
recommendations would better enable the citizen to probe the
designation and the arbiter to scrutinize its validity and judge
reliability, and the federal evidentiary measures include preferences
for non-hearsay as well as for live testimony. 271

266. The alien terrorist removal legislation abjures reliance on the federal rules. See 8

u.s.c. § 1534(h) (2000).

267. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 264 (surveying how the burden of proof is
apportioned). CIPA allows the government to seek analogous determinations about
classified data. See Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6 (2000); see
also sources cited supra note 204.
268. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34, 538 (2004).
269. See id. at 538 (first emphasis added). I analyze the ideas in this paragraph in the
event that I have misjudged her view or the arbiter allows this proffer in non-exigent
situations and because the Government's case is also considered at this juncture.
270. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534; accord Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 369, 374-75 (4th
Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); see also supra notes 71,
252 and accompanying text.
271. See FED. R. Evm. 804; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 264, § 245. See generally
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 804.01-804.02, 804.03[6][c] (Joseph McLaughlin,
ed., 2007) (discussing the hearsay exceptions that apply when witnesses are unavailable).
Hamdi's circumstances elucidate these concepts because reliance on the Mobbs
declaration would not have sufficed.
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Detainee's Rebuttal

Once the United States has justified the enemy combatant label,
the plurality dictated that the individual must have a "fair opportunity
to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker." 272 Justice O'Connor emphasized these requirements,
yet she posited limited guidance apart from the notions that the
hearings would reflect the context and would be "granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. " 273
The opportunity to rebut should encompass the detainee's
testimony, testimony furnished by people who support the citizen,
related oral or documentary input which the detainee adduces, and
cross examination of U.S. witnesses. The factfinder must permit the
detainee to offer the greatest information and tender the most
effective response consistent with national security and the federal
rules, as his liberty will be at stake. These views, and the abilities to
dispute the classification, underscore the importance of legal
representation.
g. National Security, Civil Liberties, and Protective Mechanisms

Justice O'Connor evinced concern about the foundational
precepts of security and liberty and the importance of meticulously
reconciling them when opposed. For example, her decision voiced
confidence that judges would determine the core facts in a "prudent
and incremental" way and "pay proper heed" to security and liberty,
which she observed can be in tension. 274 However, Justice O'Connor
analyzed few means of realizing those goals. 275
To the extent that the detainee's presentation or his cross
examination may jeopardize security, the adjudicator should review
and use numerous, time-honored devices which foster that interest,
safeguard liberty, and accommodate both when they conflict. These
encompass protective orders as well as the military and state secret
privileges, which shield classified data. 276 Related techniques are ex
272. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; see supra note 65 and accompanying text. Fair rebuttal
would require full notice and access to the Government's basis for the designation. See
supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
273. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 537-38 (citations omitted); see supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
274. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539; see also supra notes 53--64, 88 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. In fairness, Justice O'Connor did
proffer a rather significant number of concrete suggestions. See, e.g., supra notes 229, 237,
253,259,261,272-73.
276. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e) (2000); Classified Information Procedures Act, 18
U.S.C. app. 3 § 3 (2000); see also United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799-801 (2d Cir.
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parte and in camera inspections of material that would ostensibly
undermine security, with dependence on alternatives, especially
summaries, if needed, which Justice O'Connor broached and CIPA,
FISA and the alien terrorist reQ1oval legislation prescribe. 277 Closed
hearings, when indicated, and document redaction are similar
mechanisms that judges have employed for the Hamdi and Padilla
litigation and the criminal prosecution against Zacarias Moussaoui. 278
The basic, opposed values of security and liberty and the admonitions
by Justice O'Connor warrant reliance on those methods.
2. Exigent Situations

When the factfinder definitively ascertains that a continuing
military initiative demands procedural tailoring to burden the
Executive less, a few concepts which obtain in non-exigent scenarios
will apply. Illustrative are access to the premises that underlie the
designation and the opportunity for representation, which are
furnished citizens, as well as many additional strictures that I have
evaluated. 279

1996) (detailing CIPA's process for the disclosure of classified information); El-Masri v.
United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302-13 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that the state secrets privilege
precluded litigation under the Alien Tort Statute); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp.
2d 974, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (outlining the state secrets privilege); Am. Civil Liberties
Union v. Nat'! Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758-66 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (finding that
the state secrets privilege did not apply to the National Security Agency's data mining
program), rev'd, Nos. 06-2095/06-2140, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16149, 2007 FED App.
0253P (6th Cir. July 6, 2007); United States v. Ressam, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258-62
(W.D. Wash. 2002) (applying CIPA and state secrets privilege). See generally Adam
Liptak, A Case So Shielded One Side Is in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2007, at AlO
(discussing appeals of two cases involving state secrets privilege).
277. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e); 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6;
50 U.S.C. § 1845(f). See generally United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999)
(affording the trial court wide discretion in conducting a voire dire); United States v. Isa,
923 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1991) (addressing the use of informants and electronic
surveillance).
278. See United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F.
Supp. 2d 564, 608--09 (S.D.N. Y. 2002) (discussing the issues surrounding the court's
consideration of the sealed Mobbs declaration); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 714 (1974) (upholding in camera review of presidential materials). Moussaoui's
prosecution fostered certain difficulties which these measures do not resolve. See United
States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292, 315 (4th Cir. 2004). District Judge Marcia Cooke has
also applied these measures in the Southern District of Florida prosecution of Padilla. See
Deborah Sontag, In Padilla Wiretaps, Murky View of "Jihad" Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2007, at Al. See generally Liptak, supra note 276 (discussing extreme secrecy in cases
involving state secrets privilege).
279. See supra notes 246-252.
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The decisionmaker should also consider the Hamdi guidance and
other pertinent measures, namely the CIP A, FISA, and alien terrorist
removal schemes, and effectuate techniques that could obviate or
limit difficulties the hearings might provoke. For instance, Justice
O'Connor said that the adjudicator may need to treat hearsay as most
reliable, yet she was not countenancing wholesale admission because
she indicated that the Government would have to demonstrate how a
military effort necessitates the use of hearsay. 280 Justice O'Connor
also thought that the factfinder might grant the United States'
contribution a rebuttable presumption, so long as the individual has a
fair opportunity to dispute the material.281 Accordingly, when there is
credible evidence that the detainee satisfies the enemy combatant
designation standards, he may have to rebut this "with more
persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria." 282 If litigation
tactics before or at the hearings jeopardize security, the arbiter should
invoke the mechanisms I have discussed, such as provisos which
Congress designed to rectify that eventuality. 283
c.

Summary By Way of Justifications

Numerous themes justify this guidance. The measures proposed
protect security and liberty through assessment, calibration, and
reconciliation of the fundamental, and occasionally divergent, tenets.
For example, imposing the proof burdens analyzed on the
Government in non-exigent situations and a rebuttable presumption,
when its tender is credible, on the detainee for exigent ones
accommodates the two values and the litigants.
The ideas
concomitantly honor Justice O'Connor's delicate balance and her
perspectives while elaborating, augmenting, and refining the
concepts. Judges have also used for decades a number of techniques,
such as in camera evaluations and document redaction, which
safeguard America and the citizen. Moreover, designating the
judiciary as factfinders promotes neutral, equitable decisionmaking.
Furthermore, the suggestions afford much concrete guidance, with
dependence on venerable principles; namely, the rules of evidence
and habeas, but judges will maintain flexibility to address diverse
280. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34, 538-39 (2004); see also supra notes
68, 87 and accompanying text.
281. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534, 538-39; see also supra notes 68, 87 and accompanying
text.
282. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534; see also supra notes 69, 257-58 and accompanying
text.
283. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
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circumstances. The views also respect separated powers by, for
instance, urging that lawmakers and the Executive work together and
implement expeditiously comprehensive measures that govern the
hearings, while practical advice is furnished for decisionmakers who
will conduct them.
CONCLUSION

The detention of U.S. citizens through designation as enemy
combatants poses intractable dilemmas related to national security,
civil liberties, and the distribution of federal governmental authority.
The Hamdi Supreme Court plurality treated some questions when it
held that detentions are valid but that citizens must receive due
process. However, the Justices identified few mechanisms which
should apply, and certain specifics that were delineated remain
unclear. Fourth Circuit disposition of these and closely related issues
has also lacked clarity. If judges follow the guidance which this
Article offers, they can elucidate detention jurisprudence and balance
security and liberty. Congress in turn should review and use the ideas
offered in the Article to pass thorough legislation.

